U.S Air Force Combat Flight Creating Reliable

The Battle Won In Air

Today’s challenging global environment necessitates capable leaders at all levels to ensure the success of our force. Our Airmen are engaged in a dizzying array of missions today, ranging from operating satellites in deep space, applying air power to the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq, maintaining air defense of the skies over
the United States, launching Air Mobility Command aircraft approximately every 90 seconds, 24/7, 365 days a year, to directly supporting humanitarian missions around the globe. The methodical steps to develop these well-rounded Airmen begin the moment they take the oath of office, accepting the Core Values—Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. These core values are what defines us as Airmen and empowers us to learn from our forefathers and accept the responsibilities and challenges of the future.

In place or deployed, our Airmen and their families are our most important priority and the key to our continued success. Maintaining peak combat capability begins and ends with smart, healthy, motivated, trained, and well-equipped Airmen. To this end, we have a continued need to recruit, retain, equip, and train our entire force. These challenges are great and the stakes are incredibly high. While we give Airmen leaders the tools they need to overcome even the greatest odds, we must continue to look for new and innovative ways to maintain and improve our training, personal and professional education, and quality of life to meet today’s commitments while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.

We are a seamlessly integrated and expeditionary Total Force transparently composed of Active Duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Civilians. Our Total Force is what makes the Air Force unique. Flying high over our cities are fighter, refueling, and airlift aircraft providing everything from Presidential support, Homeland Defense, Humanitarian relief, GWOT support, to training missions; all fly the same aircraft and all aircrew wear the same uniform. There are subtle differences. These Airmen can be active duty Airmen, airline pilots, teachers, doctors, or your neighbors performing part-time duty as Air Force Reservists or Air National Guard Airmen.

To continue our expeditionary success, we deliberately develop Airmen with international insight, foreign language proficiency, and cultural understanding to enhance our effectiveness in a dynamic international environment. All Airmen must have the right skill sets to understand the specific regional context in which Air,Space, and Cyberspace power may be applied. Knowledge is power and empowering our Airmen is what sustains the United States Air Force as the world’s premier Air Force.

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U.S. Air Force The Global War On Terror

Mission and Priorities Of The U.S. Air Force Major

We are at a critical juncture in the history of the United States Air Force. We find our service, our department, and our Nation in a transition period that will shape the nation’s security for years to come. Tomorrow’s expeditionary Air Force will be even greater than today’s—more agile, more compact, and more effective than ever ensuring global Air, Space, and Cyberspace dominance for the United States in
the 21st Century.

 America’s Air Force, as a total force of Active Duty, Air National Guard, Reserve, and Civilian, continues to prosecute the Global War on Terror while remaining ready to engage whatever enemy chooses to confront the world’s preeminent Air, Space, and Cyberspace force. In order to continue our legacy as the world’s best Air Force, we have developed and instituted a set of priorities that are central to our Joint war fighting success. By focusing on these priorities Winning the Global War on Terror, Developing Airmen, and Recapitalizing and Modernizing the Total Force we are prepared to face the challenges of today and the uncertainties of tomorrow.

Winning the Glo bal War on Terror

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) constitutes a U.S. led response to global terrorism. Our mission within this war is to defeat terrorists whose tactics and global vision encompass extremism, tyranny, and oppression. Our enemies in this conflict are constantly evolving. To fight them, we must remain vigilant in our pursuit of ensuring the continued safety and security of our nation and her citizens.

The Air Force is committed to this mission and will continue to project its many unique capabilities to defeat our enemies anywhere in the world. Maintaining combat readiness is a key factor in supporting the GWOT. We must sustain our critical mission areas of Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power, while continually maintaining an agile, adaptable, persistent, lethal, and surge-ready air, space, and cyber force.

For more than 16 consecutive years, the Air Force has taken the fight to hostile forces around the world while maintaining a constant combat posture. We continue our combat contributions through ongoing actions in Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and the GWOT. This “Long War,” with its ongoing support to the Combatant Commander is changing the way we operate. While continuing to support the nation’s efforts at home and abroad, we must continue to learn through Joint lessons how to further fight and defeat terrorism globally.

The character and capabilities of our enemies are increasingly uncertain, veiled, growing, and constantly changing. Air, Space, and Cyberspace must wield the capabilities necessary to dissuade potential adversaries and rapidly overcome them if needed. The Air Force maintains and continues to reinforce these global capabilities to secure America’s future security.

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Sout Korea Military Power Vs North Korea Army

South Korean perspective, while the overall security environment improved with the demise of the Soviet empire, there is now greater uncertainty and a growing number of threats with which to contend. Mismanagement and improper handling of emerging issues and lingering problems will be detrimental to South
Korean security as well as to stability and peace throughout Northeast Asia.

Within this environment, there are two compelling necessities: first, to maintain a strong security alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States, and second, to augment the ROK military on the peninsula and across Northeast Asia. This article examines the uncertainty and threats that face South Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and South Korean defense requirements. four to be unattainable. The North is left with the military offensive in which it has an advantage over the South. In a word, North Korea’s aggressive intent can be backed only by military means.

Among South Korean security concerns, the foremost threat is presented by North Korea’s aggressive intentions and large military establishment. While it has signed important accords with Seoul—the Basic
Agreement, the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, and the Provisions—North Korea has failed to implement the terms. Rather it is committed to communizing the entire Korean peninsula by use of force. For
Pyongyang unification calls for integrating the divided territory as well as consolidating juche ideology and its ways. The North cannot afford to give up this ultimate goal because it has legitimized the regime and persuaded its people to unite and to make sacrifices. Toward this goal North Korea has adopted a strategy of five besieging offensives:

political peace, ideological, external/ diplomatic, espionage, and, finally, military. But history has proven the first   four to be unattainable. The North is left with the military offensive in which it has an advantage over the South. In a word, North Korea’s aggressive intent can be backed only by military means.

Even with a faltering economy, North Korea has made every effort to modernize its forces and to maintain a military edge over the South. Not only are the North’s forces highly mobile and mechanized; approximately 65 percent are near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and on a high state of readiness.

These strengths would permit the North to launch a blitzkrieg against the South without reinforcement, redeployment, or massive mobilization. It is believed that North Korea plans either to sweep the entire peninsula before American reinforcements arrive or to partly occupy the Seoul metropolitan area in the early stages of a war. In both cases South Korea, with its capital located only 40 kilometers from the DMZ, would suffer severely. Arms control may be the most suitable way to reduce military tension along the DMZ. But arms control talks are unlikely to yield success.


Though initiatives have been proposed some 280 times since the Korean War, most of them are unrealistic
and have served mainly as propaganda. In fact, in the Basic Agreement and the Provisions, the North
agreed to introduce some declaratory arms control measures and to negotiate further. But it has failed to do so. Moreover, it has been trying to weaken the ROK–U.S. combined defense posture by demanding the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as a precondition for talks. Thus, North Korea is not committed to creating a stable military situation on the peninsula. Rather it tries to retain a militarily favorable condition for achieving forceful unification. One can therefore expect the military threat to continue.

The North’s conventional military threat has been heightened by its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction. While it is uncertain whether North Korea has nuclear weapons, it definitely has the capability to produce them. Strategically, a nuclear-armed North could prevent the United States from using nuclear weapons by holding South Korea and parts of Japan hostage.

Pyongyang could thus undermine extended deterrence and confound escalation control in a conflict between the two Koreas. In other words, by complicating strategic responses and weakening the credibility of deterrence vis-à-vis the South, a nuclear-armed North could gain an active deterrent against the United States while launching a conventional attack. Thus, under any circumstance, North Korea cannot be allowed to acquire such weapons or retain a clandestine nuclear capability.

North Korea Tank

 The focus on nuclear issues has tended to overshadow other weapons of mass destruction, that is, chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. While one should not underestimate the strategic value of biological and toxin weapons, chemical weapons are of particular concern. Although party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Pyongyang eschewed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Perhaps this is because it has developed a reliable chemical weapons capability.

It is believed that the North has stockpiled 1,000 tons of such weaponry and can produce 4,500 tons of chemicals annually. It has various chemical agents, including sarin, tabun, phosgene, adamsite, mustard gas, and blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide). Furthermore, it has delivery means which include artillery pieces, multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars, and missiles. Rodong and Taepo Dong–2 missiles could threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States by making most major East Asian cities vulnerable to attack.

Korea Military Power

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Nato Strategy In The War Against Terrorist

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States further transformed NATO policy and doctrinal stances. The day after the attack, NATO of its charter for the first time, which requires members to come to the defense of each other when attacked.28 A significant demonstration of NATO interest in enhancing its military capability was its November 21, 2002, Prague Summit decision to create a NATO Rapid Response Force (RRF). RRF was envisioned as consisting of technologically advanced, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable forces with land, air, and sea assets ready to move quickly at NATO Council determination.

NATO also sought to enhance its ability to make agile responses to military crises by replacing fixed mobile headquarters with nine Rapid Reaction Headquarters; inaugurating a program to deal with proliferating mass destruction weapons; and strengthening intelligence sharing to include European and U.S. homeland security.

The biggest change these attacks prompted NATO to make was the decision to begin operations in Afghanistan after U.S.-led forces overthrew the Taliban regime in response to its support of the Al Qaida terrorist perpetrators of the 9/11attacks. NATO operations in Afghanistan began when the alliance assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. ISAF represents NATO’s first mission outside of the Euro-Atlantic region and its focus was initially restricted to Kabul. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1510, passed on October 13, 2003, enabled ISAF to support the Afghan Government throughout the entire country.

ISAF’s organizational structure consists of four components, including ISAF Headquarters, which is responsible for providing operational-level direction and planning to the Kabul Multinational Brigade, conducting operational assignments in its area of responsibility, and assisting the Afghan national government and nongovernmental organizations; the Kabul Multinational Brigade, which serves as ISAF’s tactical headquarters responsible for planning, conducting, and patrolling civil-military operations on a daily basis; the Kabul International Airport, which assists Afghanistan’s Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in operating this airport; and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are civil-military partnerships responsible for providing security and reconstruction in Afghanistan’s regions and helping the national government extend its authority over these regions. These responsibilities are executed by approximately 52,700 personnel from 36 NATO, nine partner, and two non-NATO/non-partner countries.

The biggest change these attacks prompted NATO to make was the decision to begin operations in Afghanistan after U.S.-led forces overthrew the Taliban regime in response to its support of the Al Qaida terrorist perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. NATO operations in Afghanistan began when the alliance assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. ISAF represents NATO’s fi rst mission outside of the Euro-Atlantic region and its focus was initially restricted to Kabul. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1510, passed on October 13, 2003, enabled ISAF to support the Afghan Government throughout the entire country.

Consequently, the quality of the ISAF/ NATO response and campaigns in Afghanistan has undergone considerable scrutiny and criticism, and there is signifi cant debate within the international security
community regarding the likely success of ISAF and the overall quality of its Afghanistan operations. Some of this criticism and debate concerns whether individual ISAF country participants are committing enough troops to fi ght the Taliban and giving their forces sufficiently liberal rules of engagement to conduct effective combat operations. the NATO/ISAF performance in Afghanistan will have a profound influence on NATO’s political endurance and military operational viability in future international security crises.

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American And Soviet Nuclear War

Acritical component of this strategy is reflected in the following declaration :

So long as forces committed to NATO and the external nuclear forces supporting the alliance are able to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet nuclear society even after a surprise nuclear attack, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will deliberately initiate a general war or any other aggression in the NATO area that involves a clear risk of escalation to nuclear war.

Flexible response remained the cornerstone of offi cial NATO strategic doctrine for the next two decades. However, there was criticism of its ambiguous nature and belief that it did not refl ect changing European strategic conditions and public opinion during the 1970s and 1980s. These criticisms were voiced in a 1988
article in the U.S. Army War College professional journal Parameters.

This article stated that strategic parity between the United States and Soviet Union had eroded the credibility of threats of deliberate escalation and detracted from NATO’s ability to use nuclear threats to deter non-nuclear attacks and halt Soviet advances if deterrence failed. This article also maintained that U.S. and Soviet acquisition of a wide spectrum of theater and strategic nuclear forces undercuts the rationale NATO uses to justify the deliberate escalation portion of its flexible response strategy and that NATO would not gain a military advantage from introducing nuclear weapons into a Warsaw pact-initiated war.

Concern over the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear deterrent caused alliance policymakers to examine ways of bolstering the effectiveness of its conventional forces. An example of this was the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) concept approved by NATO’s Defense Planning Committee in 1984. FOFA sought to build
a NATO capability to hold leading divisions of a Warsaw Pact conventional forces assault by launching effective conventional force interdiction and destruction attacks against enemy follow-on forces before their logistical and combat support could be brought to the front lines.

Explosion Nuclear - Russian/soviet - America

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War in the early 1990s and made it unnecessary for NATO to seek to implement its military doctrine against the Soviet bloc invasion it had been designed to counter. However, the collapse of the post–World War II European security architecture posed new challenges for
NATO. These would be first demonstrated when the collapse of Yugoslavia created vicious internecine ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kosovo, which would eventually compel external intervention.

Nuclear

An early attempt by NATO to formulate how to respond to the new post–Cold War security environment was its November 1991 Strategic Concept document. Key points of this document included containing the consequences of potential civil and interstate confl icts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; collaborative defense against any aggression directed at alliance territory but not operations in areas beyond; and ensuring the territorial integrity of member states as a means of enhancing European peace and stability.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization Doctrine

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began in the aftermath of World War II as victorious allied powers sought to develop security structures to prevent the occurrence of another global conflagration like World War II. The war’s conclusion saw drastic reductions in U.S. troop strength from 3,100,000 in 1945 to 391,000 in 1946 and a reduction in British troop strength from 1,321,000 to 488,000 in the same period. Subsequent attempts between the victorious allied powers to produce peace treaties failed due to Soviet obstructionism and Soviet determination to create satellite ideological governments in Eastern Europe.

This increasing tension between the western allied powers and the Soviets gradually led to increasing security collaboration between the United States and western European countries. On March 17, 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Brussels, promising
to establish a joint defensive system while enhancing their existing economic and cultural ties.

This approximate time period also saw U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall (1880–1959) and U.S. Senators Arthur Vandenberg (1884–1951) and Tom Connally (1877–1963) begin discussions on North Atlantic security matters. Negotiations between the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty participants began on July 6, 1948. These negotiations and subsequent developments led these powers to formally invite Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to sign the pact, the contents of which were made public on March 18, 1949. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the foreign ministers of these countries, and ratification of this agreement by national parliaments occurred within five months.16 West Germany’s May 5, 1955, incorporation into NATO was another sign that the alliance would grow in the future, further integrating NATO into the emerging postwar European security architecture.

The pentomic division structure proved unworkable, but the emphasis on nuclear deterrence was initially ratified with the May 23, 1957, approval of Military Committee Document (MC) 14/2, which stressed that if a general war occurred, NATO should “ensure the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counteroffensive by all available means and develop the capability to absorb and survive the enemy’s onslaught.” Although this document provided latitude for NATO conventional forces to conduct operations, its preeminent emphasis on nuclear deterrence is unequivocal.

This strategy would be updated by the flexible response doctrine enunciated in MC 14/3, issued on January 16, 1968. Influenced by the advocacy of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1916–), MC 14/3 articulated a policy of direct defense, initially emphasizing conventional forces in which the alliance would
seek to defeat aggression at the level at which the enemy chose to fight, placing the burden of escalation upon invading forces. MC 14/3 gave NATO the option of deliberately escalating to nuclear force, but controlling the scope and intensity of combat by increasing the aggressor’s cost and increasing the imminence of a nuclear response. Suchescalatory steps could include demonstrative uses of nuclear weapons and selective nuclear strikes on Soviet bloc interdiction targets.

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U N Doctrine In World War

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations began in 1948 when the Security Council established an onsite operation of 36 unarmed military observers to preserve a truce after the fi rst Arab-Israeli War.

UN peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council, which the United Nations charter designates as the organization primarily responsible for maintaining peace and security. However, fi nancial aspects of peacekeeping operations are managed by the General Assembly. These organizations have delegated to the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) the responsibility for implementing UN peacekeeping objectives.

 

 Sixty-three UN peacekeeping operations have been conducted or were underway as of April 30, 2008, with 17 of these operations being active. These active operations involve 88,202 uniformed personnel, including soldiers, police, and military observers, from 117 countries. The fi nancial cost of operations from July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008, was approximately $6.8 billion, the cumulative fi nancial cost of all operations from 1948 to the present is about $54 billion, and they have resulted in 2,468 peacekeeper fatalities, as of April 30, 2008.

These operations have been assigned to a number of crisis areas around the globe and are denominated by a variety of acronyms. For instance, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established in June 1999, consists of 39 military observers, 1,917 police, 1,959 local civilians, and an overall personnel involvement of 4,503. Fifty-three fatalities have resulted from this mission, whose current annual budget is $210,676,800. Other examples of current UN peacekeeping missions included UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), and United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

 The quality and effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations is controversial. Supporters of these operations maintain that the UN is the most cost-effective means for grappling with international confl ict and crises, that U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq mean that the United States cannot shoulder such operations on its own, that the United States should value the expertise UN members can bring to peacekeeping operations in diverse global environments, and that the UN, because of its perceived impartiality, can go into confl ict areas where individual countries like the United States cannot. Critics of UN Peacekeeping operations assert that such operations give dangerous control to global authorities who may be antagonistic to U.S. national security interests, that the countries with the most capable militaries are less likely to contribute troops for peacekeeping, while those with the least capable militaries are the most likely to contribute their forces for such operations, that these forces are not given suffi ciently liberal rules of engagement to effectively combat hostile operations against such missions, and that there are too many operational and cultural differences between members of these forces, who are trained in varying military traditions, to allow them to operate effectively together.

An extensive corpus of military and political science literature exists on the performance and effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations, refl ecting a variety of perspectives. Topics addressed in this literature include whether the United States should participate in UN peacekeeping operations and whether U.S. forces
should be commanded by foreign military leaders; managerial and fi nancial support for such operations; the performance of UN peacekeepers in areas such as Bosnia, the Golan Heights, Haiti, and Sierra Leone; and the factors necessary for peacekeeping operations and subsequent confl ict reconciliation to occur in these countries, including ethnic integration and incorporating combatants into the political process.

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