Isareli Joint U.S Arrow I/IV and LGM-30 Minutema III Test SuccessFul

Arrow anti-ballistic missile
An Arrow anti-ballistic missile successfully intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile target today during a joint United States/Israel test program. The test was part of the ongoing Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP). This was the twelfth Arrow intercept test and the seventh test of the complete Arrow system. The test was conducted at the Point Mugu Sea Range in California. The objective of the test was to demonstrate the Arrow system's improved performance against a target that represents a threat to Israel. The test represented a realistic scenario that could not have been tested in Israel due to test-field safety restrictions.

An Arrow anti-ballistic missile is launched as part of the ongoing United States/Israel Arrow System Improvement Program. The missile intercepted a short-range target west of San Nicolas Island on the Pt. Mugu Sea Range in California. This was the twelfth Arrow intercept test and the seventh test of the complete Arrow system.

LGM-30 Minuteman III

In the United States, LGM-30 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have been fired in tests on at least 11 separate occasions from June 2004 to September 2006 over distances of 6,500km to over 8,000km between Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands.

Tests of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) took place on at least six occasions in the same period. These are interceptor missiles, so each intercept test also involves the launching of a target ballistic missile. Eight such intercept tests have been held to date.

Similarly, flight tests of various versions of Patriot missile interceptors (PAC-3 and Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles) usually involve the “ripple firing” of two interceptors against two ballistic missiles
simulating an attack, adding up to four missiles in each test. The target missiles are usually PAAT
(Patriot-as-a-Target, older Patriot missiles modified to represent a short-range incoming ballistic missile). Tests of this nature were held at least six times between June 2004 and June 2006. One such test, on 18 November 2004, involved some six missiles in the air simultaneously. In another instance, in early September 2004, Patriots were fired at both a short-range ballistic missile and at a cruise missile.

In the framework of missile defence research and development, the ballistic missiles acting as targets are also test-fired on their own, as in the test of an orbital long-range target missile from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii on 28 April 2006, or of a long-range Strategic Target System (STARS) rocket from the Kodiak Launch Complex on Kodiak Island in Alaska on 23 February 2006. A medium-range target missile, the Castor IVB target vehicle, also underwent a test flight on 4 August 2005. On 6 October 2004, the Missile Defense Agency launched a suborbital rocket to test the tracking abilities of missile defence systems.


Conversely, interceptor missiles also get flight-tested on their own on occasions, as was the case with the Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) missile on 14 December 2005, or of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile on 22 November 2005. Tests carried out in the United States can also involve interceptors developed in international cooperation and, apparently, target ballistic missiles of foreign origin. Thus the test on 29 July 2004, near Los Angeles, of the Arrow missile defence system jointly developed by the United States and Israel involved the use as target of a Scud ballistic missile reportedly confiscated from Iraq.

Arrow-2 Ballistic Missile Test

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Israel Nuclear And Biological Weapons

Isreael Nuclear Weapons And Plutonium

Jericho-3 ICBM

This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise assessment of a state's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently.

Most public estimates range between 100-200 weapons (e.g., Amy Dockser Marcus, "Growing Dangers: U.S. Drive to Curb Doomsday Weapons In Mideast Is Faltering," Wall Street Journal, 9/6/96, p. A1), but one analyst concludes that "the Israeli nuclear arsenal contains as many as 400 deliverable nuclear and thermonuclear weapons." Harold Hough, "Could Israel's Nuclear Assets Survive A First Strike?" Jane's Intelligence Review, 9/97, p. 410.

Israel's nuclear capability is by most accounts quite sophisticated, and may include "intercontinental-range, fractional-orbit-delivered thermonuclear weapons; thermonuclear or boosted nuclear-armed, two-stage, solid-fuel, intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000km; older, less accurate, nuclear-armed, theatre-range, solid-fuel ballistic missiles; air-deliverable, variable-yield, boosted nuclear bombs; artillery-delivered, enhanced-radiation, tactical weapons; and small nuclear demolition charges."

Sophisticated nuclear weapons program with an estimated 100-200 weapons, which can be delivered by ballistic missiles or aircraft. Nuclear arsenal may include thermonuclear weapons.

IRR-1 5MW research reactor at Soreq, under IAEA safeguards. IRR-2 40-150MW heavy water reactor and plutonium processing facility at Dimona, which are not under IAEA safeguards. Not a signatory of the NPT; signed the CTBT.

For future Plutonium production projections, it is assumed that the Dimaona reactor will maintain a power of 40 to 70 MW(t), and produce about 8.8 to15 kg of Plutonium per year. It is also assumed that each warhead requires an average of 5 kg of weapon-grade Plutonium.

Based on the Plutonium production estimates, and the estimate of 5 kg per warhead, Israel could have constructed between 52 and 94 warheads up to the end of 1990, and could have produced another 24
weapons in 1991.

Shavit Missile

The most recent version of the missile seems to be a two-stage, solid-fuel propellant with a range of up to 900 miles (1,500 kilometers) with a 2,200 pound payload.

There are reports that Israel is developing a Jericho III missile, based on a booster it developed with South Africa in the 1980s. Jane‘s estimated that the missile has a range of up to 5,000 kilometers and a 1,000-kilogram warhead. This estimate is based largely on a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency estimate of the launch capability of the Shavit booster that Israel tested on September 19, 1988.

Israel Biological Weapons

Production capability and extensive research reportedly conducted at the Biological Research Institute in Ness Ziona. No publicly confirmed evidence of production. Not a signatory of the BTWC.

Isreal Ballistic missiles

  

Israel launched a Jericho II missile across the Mediterranean that landed about 250 miles north of Benghazi, Libya. The missile flew over 800 miles, and U.S. experts felt it had a maximum range of up to 900-940 miles (1,450 kilometers), which would allow the Jericho II to cover virtually all of the Arab world.

1. Approximately 50 Jericho-2 Medium Range Ballistic missiles with 1,500km range and 1,000kg payload, nuclear warheads may be stored in close proximity.

2. Approximately 50-100 Jericho-1 Short Range Ballistic missiles with 500-1,000km range and 500kg payload.

4. MGM-52 Lance missiles with 130km range and 450kg payload.

5. Shavit space launch vehicle (SLV) with 4,500km range and 150-250kg payload.

6. Unconfirmed reports of Jericho-3 program under development using Shavit technologies, with a range up to 4,800km and 1,000kg payload.

7. Developing LK-1 and LK-2 (Shavit upgrades) with 350kg and 800kg payloads, respectively.

Israael Cruiser Missile

1. Gabriel-4 anti-ship cruise missile with 200km range and 500kg payload.
2. Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile with 120km range and 220kg payload.
5. Alleged Popeye Turbo air-launched cruise missile with 200-300km range and unknown payload.

Shavit-1Missile Up to Shavit-3 Missile

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Israel's Largest Nuclear Reactor in Nahal Soreq

Nuclear reactor project at the World's Largest

Israel has two significant reactor projects: the 5 megawatt highly enriched uranium light-water IRR I reactor at Nahal Soreq; and the 75-200 megawatt heavy-water IRR-2 natural uranium reactor used for the production of fissile Plutonium material at Dimona. Only the IRR-1 is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

Dimona has conducted experiments in pilot scale laser and centrifuge enrichment, purifies uranium dioxide (UO2), converts uranium hexafluoride (UF6,), and fabricates fuel for weapons purpose.

1. Uranium phosphate mining in the Negev, near Beersheba, and yellowcake is produced at two plants in the Haifa area and one in southern Israel.

2. Pilot-scale heavy water plant operating at Rehovot.

3. Estimates of numbers and types of weapons differ sharply :

a. No agreement exists over the plutonium output from the reactor at Dimona. Which is reported at power outputs from 75-200 megawatts. Satellite photos indicate that output is more likely to be below 140 megawatts.

b. Stockpile of at least 60-80 plutonium weapons.

c. May have well over 100 nuclear weapons assemblies, with some weapons with yields over 100 kilotons.

d. U.S. experts believe Israel has highly advanced implosion weapons. Known to have produced Lithium-6, allowing production of both tritium and lithium deuteride at Dimona. Facility no longer believed to be operating.

* Some weapons may be ER variants or have variable yields.

*Stockpile of up to 300-400 weapons is possible. Lower limit could be 70-100.gsss

* There exists a possibility that Israel may have developed thermonuclear warheads.

Major weapons facilities include production of weapons-grade plutonium at Dimona, nuclear weapons designfacility at Nahal Soreq (south of Tel Aviv), missile test facility at Palmachim, nuclear armed missile storage facility at Kefar Zekharya, nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat, and tactical nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun in eastern Galilee.

A useful rule of thumb for gauging the proliferation of any given reactor is that 1 Megawatt-day (thermal energy release, not electricity output) of operation produces 1 gram of Plutonium in any reactor using 20% or lower Enriched Uranium.
map

The number of nuclear weapons Israel produced depends on how much Plutonium has been produced at Dimona. The credibility of Vanunu‘s statement is essential in trying to assess Israel‘s nuclear capability.

According to Mordechai Vanunu the Nuclear Reactor at Dimona was scaled up twice, the first was from 26 MW(t) to 70 MW(t), and the second just before he arrived at the facility was from 70 MW(t) to some higher level which produced 40 kg of Plutonium every year. This study assumes that the Dimona Reactor was operated at 150 MW(t) by 1977, which would result in producing 40 kg of Plutonium per year.

From this the maximum and minimum yearly output of weapons-grade Plutonium fuel can be estimated, and the number of Plutonium based nuclear weapons that can be produced. (see Appendix).  

This is shown in the next chart in three stages:

> First being that Dimona operated at a capacity of 26 MWt from 1963 until end of 1969, then from 1970 up to 1976 it operated at the upgraded capacity of 70 MWt.

>Total Plutonium produced if the reactor was operating 60% of the time is 147 kg. This is would produce 29 weapons that are 5 kg (10 kt yield), or 18 weapons that are 8 kg (20 kt yield).

> Total Plutonium produced if the reactor was operating 90% of the time is 224 kg. This is would produce 45 weapons that are 5 kg (10 kt yield), or 28 weapons that are 8 kg (20 kt yield).

Second: Dimona continues to operate at Capacity of 70 Mega Waat from 1976 until 2008 i.e. no upgrade up to 150 MWt.

* Total Plutonium produced if the reactor was operating 60% of the time is 627 kg. This is would produce

125 weapons that are 5 kg (10 kt yield), or 78 weapons that are 8 kg (20 kt yield).

* Total Plutonium produced if the reactor was operating 90% of the time is 960 kg. This is would produce

192 weapons that are 5 kg (10 kt yield), or 120 weapons that are 8 kg (20 kt yield).

 Third : Dimona operates at Capacity of 150 MWt from 1976 until 2008, according to Mordecai Vanunu.
 

- Total Plutonium produced if the reactor was operating 60% of the time is 1203 kg. This is would produce 240 weapons that are 5 kg (10 kt yield), or 150 weapons that are 8 kg (20 kt yield).

- Total Plutonium produced if the reactor was operating 90% of the time is 1791 kg. This is would produce 358 weapons that are 5 kg (10 kt yield), or 223 weapons that are 8 kg (20 kt yield).

Our calculated estimate comes out to be consistent and close with what was written about Dimona by David Albright at the ISIS.

Map View Israel Nuclear area Klick Titel Map Nuclear Israel

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Israel Nuclear Missile and Uranium Inventories

Israel Nuclear Weapon And Missile Uranium Target and Mission 

Israel‘s National Nuclear Security Doctrine:

This is based on the perception that Arab countries are determined to destroy Israel; that Israel has no reliable
international allies and must take care of itself; there is an asymmetrical balance of resources versus the Arab
Countries in Demography, Geography, Economic Resources, Structure of Armed Forces in terms of man power.

Israel‘s Operational Military Doctrine:

That Israel must have the capability to deter any possible Arab attack, and if deterrence fails then Israel must
strive for an early war termination if war breaks out. That any war with the Arab countries would have to be
short and decisive. That the war must quickly be carried into and fought on Arab territory giving rise to a rapid offensive and high degree of mobility to sustain conte. The possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by any Arab or non-Arab Muslim State in the region is considered as a direct existential threat to Israel. Israel should prevent all Stateinuous forward movement.

 Israel‘s Nuclear Policy:

A nuclear capability is needed to deter threats to Israel‘s existencmbiguity about it‘s own nuclear weapons program.

The purpose of the nuclear ambiguity policy was based on the belief that it had introduced an effective "deterrences in the Middle East Region from developing a nuclear program that it sees as a threat, or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel has deliberately maintained a nuclear policy a through uncertainty". Arab states were never sure that Israel would use a nuclear weapon in retaliation to it‘s survival in the event of a major war, or if any of the Arab states try to acquire a nuclear capability.

Israel‘s nuclear ambiguity policy has been stated by a number of Israeli leaders in such statements as:

1. Israel will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and
2. Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East :

• The Arab States‘ view is that such nuclear doctrines can never be considered binding in case of war.

• Israel has never officially admitted that it possesses Nuclear Weapons, and is not a signatory to the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many see the present status of Israel as an "Undeclared Nuclear Weapon State", at the same time it has become to be recognized as possessing a very sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Video Israel Nuclear Reactor

Cooperation Israel with France in nuclear reactor design

• Uranium exploration began in Negev as early as 1949; Israeli Atomic Energy Commission began to discuss nuclear option in 1952. Cooperation with France in nuclear reactor design and technology began in 1950s. French-Israeli construction of a reactor in Dimona – whose actual capacity was much larger than its announced capacity, began in 1957.

US detected the project in 1958, and visited the reactor during the 1960s, but Israel concealed its true output and performance characteristics.

• Britain sells 20-tons of heavy water to Israel in 1959-1960. It also sells beryllium and lithium-6. These sales are critical to bringing the kind of reactor Israel needs on line, and potentially useful in easing its problems in producing  "boosted" fission and fusion weapons.

• Possible nuclear test (implosion proof of principle or "zero yield") in Negev on November 2, 1966.

• By 1968, the CIA publicly estimated that Israel had nuclear weapons. It estimated that Israel had 10-20 nuclear weapons.

• By 1986, leaks by Mordecai Vanunu, and from other sources, led to estimates that Israel had some 100-200 fission weapons. The possibility existed that it had  boosted fission weapons with yields in the 60-100 kiloton (KT) range.

• October 1973: reports that Prime Minister Golda Meir orders IDF to assemble nuclear weapons for delivery in response to Egyptian and Syrian attacks, and that .Jericho missiles at Hirbat Zachariah and nuclear strike F-4s at Tel Nof are armed.

• Reports of joint nuclear test with South Africa in 1979, but never confirmed. Israel does seem to have cooperated with South Africa in missile design and booster testing.

• The director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated in May 1989 that Israel may be seeking to construct a thermonuclear weapon.

• June 2000: reports begin to surface that Israel will arm submarines with nuclear-armed cruise or ballistic missiles. Such reports have continued ever since. Reports that Israel had modified the Harpoon cruise missile to have nuclear warheads have been regularly repeated since 2003. Germany sells Israel advanced Dolphin-class submarines in 2005.

Coentinue

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