North Korea Launched Nodong Missile

The North Korean Nodong is essentially the same as the Pakistani Ghauri 1 and the Iranian Shahab-3. The body of the Nodong missile is a near exact replica of the SCUD-B, except that all its major structural components are scaled to a larger size.9 The SCUD-B body diameter is 0.88 m, while the Nodong body diameter is close to 1.25 m. Thus the Nodong is larger than the SCUD-B in every dimension by a factor very close to 1.4 (we use the factor reported by Schiller and Schmucker of 1.25/0.88=1.42). The Ghauri 2 is also similar to the Nodong. The dimensions of this missile also appear to be scaled up by a factor of about 1.4, but its length-to-diameter ratio appears closer to that of the Iraqi Al Husain.

The Nodong rocket motor was first observed in North Korea in the late 1980s, and more recently Iran has released photographs of what appears to be a Nodong rocket motor (see photographs on the next page.) A drawing of what appears to be a device used in the manufacturing of that motor can be found in the Russian text book, “The Production Technology of Liquid Rocket Engines,” by V. V. Vorobey and V. E. Loginov.5 If this identification is correct, the Nodong rocket motor is an example of 1950s Russian rocket technology, very similar to that used in the SCUD-B, which was first built and deployed during the same time-period. The
Nodong motor uses the same fuel as the SCUD-B motor and its performance efficiency (exhaust velocity with altitude) is somewhat similar but lower than the Russian RD-214 engine used in the Soviet R-12 ballistic missile (known in the West as the SS-4 Sandal).6 The Nodong rocket motor has provided the enabling
foundation for Iran’s indigenous liquid-propellant ballistic missile program and for the Safir SLV. The No-Dong has a range of between 1,000 and 1,400km meaning that it can hit Seoul with ease from any location on the entire peninsula.

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North Korea Technical Assessment of the Unha-2 Satellite Launch Attempt

The North Korean launch on April 4/5, 2009 of a large three stage rocket, weighing about 90 tons, has provided a flood of data on both North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile programs. This data includes detailed photographs of the North Korean rocket, information on the splashdown points for the first and second stages of the rocket, satellite images of the rocket contrail that indicates the early trajectory of the rocket, verification of a wealth of earlier information derived from other analyses on the use of rocket components by Iran from its launch of the Omid satellite on February 2, 2009, and information that further supports analytical findings associated with North Korea's attempt to launch a satellite using the Taepodong 1 rocket in 1998. All the information described above is completely self-consistent and can be explained and reproduced in an internally consistent technical analysis of all these events. This powerful self consistency in the data and analysis very strongly suggests that the estimates provided in this preliminary analysis are likely to be reliable.

We find that the North Korean Unha-2 represents a very significant advance in rocket technology by North Korea. The first two stages of this vehicle functioned in the flight test. The third stage, which apparently failed to operate in the North Korean flight tests, has most probably already successfully been flown as the second stage of Iran's Safir SLV. The successful operation of the first stage indicates that North Korea has the enabling technology to build rockets that can deliver much higher payloads to much longer ranges. The successful functioning of the second stage demonstrates that North Korea has found a way to obtain a
high-performance second stage by adapting an available rocket, the SS-N-6 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile, for the second stage of the Unha-2 By using the SS-N-6 as the second stage of the Unha-2, North Korea has, in effect, obtained a second rocket stage that has an airframe that is constructed from light
high-strength aluminum alloy combined with high performance rocket motors.

Unha-2 Rocket Motor Engine

The Unha-2 with a carefully drawn overlay showing the detailed geometric features of the vehicle. In order to
facilitate an inspection of the accuracy of the outline by the reader, the right side of is the photograph of the Unha-2 with the overlay and the left side, based on the Unha-2 shape-outline derived from the photograph and guesses about the various components associated with the Unha-2 vehicle.

The first stage is assessed to carry about 68,000 to 69,000 kg of propellant and to have a total weight of about 74,000 to 75,000 kg. The estimate of the weight of propellant is based on the assumption that the fuel tanks have end-caps that have the same ratio of height to width as those used in the SCUD-B ballistic
missile. The fuel used by the first stage is assumed to be TG-185 and AK-27. This fuel combination is used in the SCUD-B, SCUD-C, SCUD-D, and the Nodong missile. The first stage is assumed to use a cluster of four Nodong rocket motors each of which generate about 30 tons of thrust. Estimates from the video of the
Unha-2 launch indicate an acceleration rate at launch of roughly 0.3 Gs.

The rocket motors therefore have a thrust of roughly 1.3 times the launch gross weigh of the vehicle. If the launch gross weight of the vehicle is about 90 tons, then the thrust of the rocket motors in the first stage is roughly 120 tons. When the silhouette of the SS-N-6 is placed over the second stage of the Unha-2 there is perfect geometric agreement. The upper frustum on the SS-N-6 has exactly the same dimensions and taper angle as that of the interstage between the second and third stages on the Unha-2. The rear end of the
SS-N-6 extends slightly into the interstage between the first and second stages.

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Korean War

Korean War The North Korea Versus South Korea

The new People’s Republic entered the Korean War on the side of North Korea in November 1950, and soon the pace of the PLAAF’s growth accelerated. It learned some valuable lessons from this war, although its performance was not particularly impressive. It lost in air combat eight of its newly acquired MiG-15 jet fighters for every one of the F-86 Saber jet fighters that the Americans fielded in the war. No doubt this poor performance was the result of throwing into the fray new and as yet inexperienced fighter pilots as well as the relative superiority of the U.S. fighters.

The Chinese also found that the PLAAF was no match for the combined effort of the Taiwanese and U.S. air forces that continually violated mainland Chinese air space during the ’50s. Air defense of the cities thus became the prime motive and the sole aim of the PLAAF. To be sure, “On 7 October 1959, [PLAAF] shot down a Taiwanese reconnaissance aircraft over Beijing, the first combat use of surface-to-air missiles anywhere in the world. In the 10 ensuing years, the missile force shot down six U.S.-made U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and three U.S.-made pilotless aircraft.”

By the late ’50s, however, China’s relations with the Soviet Union, its former friend and mentor, had soured to such an extent that China found it difficult to sustain the ambitious aircraft and aero-engine construction programs that it had embarked on during the heyday of Sino-Soviet cooperation. Quality and serviceability of equipment suffered, and drastically reduced flying hours thus started a quest for self-reliance. China soon started a process of reverse engineering the Russian equipment that it had received in huge quantities and also

launched new programs for aircraft design and development. At this time Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward movement caused serious problems. These were further exacerbated by the 10-year long Cultural Revolution (1966–76), which not only compelled the country’s intellectuals into forced labor in the rural areas but also severely disturbed the PLAAF’s training programs. A number of its technical training institutes and colleges were closed, and the students and faculty were sent to work in the fields. Leadership transitions, purges, and domestic upheavals took a heavy toll on the air force. Some of the key strategic programs,
however, such as those directed at building China’s strategic arsenals, did not suffer any adverse effects of this countrywide internal turmoil.

It is important to point out the Chinese did not really use the huge, if somewhat unwieldy, PLAAF in war during these early years. Although the Chinese had used its air force in the "liberation" of Tibet in 1950 and gained some experience from the Korean War, the PLAAF was used only for air defense duties during numerous encounters in the Taiwan Straits conflicts of the ’50s and early ’60s. China did not employ its airpower during the 1962 invasion of India, the 1969 Usuri River border conflict with the former Soviet Union, or in its 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Although in the last case the PLAAF was mobilized for war, it did
not support the army's offensive.

Another blow to the PLAAF came in 1971 after the death of Lin Biao. A veteran of the Long March and one-time heir apparent to Mao, Lin died in an air accident while fleeing China after an apparent failed coup attempt. Because of his close ties with the military, the PLA and PLAAF suffered as a result of ensuing purges. It was not until after the second coming of the visionary leader Deng Xiaoping in 1975 that PLAAF’s fortunes were revived, albeit somewhat haltingly.

In fact, Deng proved to be the savior of China’s airpower. It was he who not only articulated the decisive role that airpower would play in any future conflict but also castigated the air force for being lazy, inefficient, and overstaffed.8 Such personal interest and understanding of airpower must have made it easier for the air force to cut excesses and weed out the less educated, old, and inefficient officers. By the early ’80s the PLAAF was firmly on the path of recovery.

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North Korea Made Anti Ship Ballistic Missile

Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Officials from the Pentagon reported that North Korea had tested a cruise missile designed to target ships in the Sea of Japan, but the device missed its target during testing. U.S. officials stated that the missile, which had a range of 85 to 150 km, was developed over the course of 18 months and was an upgrade of China’s HY-2 Silkworm missile. According to a Pentagon report released in 1996, North Korea began its cruise missile program in the 1980s when it received technology from China and the Soviet Union.

A second test of the ASCM was fired over the Sea of Japan but missed its target, according to a senior Pentagon official. The test came as the United States pressed for sanctions against North Korea for its suspected nuclear weapons program. The Japanese government reported that North Korea conducted another test of the ASCM as “part of normal training” exercises.

North Korea test-launched a new ASCM called the AG-1 cruise missile from a mobile launcher. The firing of the missile was detected by a United States RC-135 Cobra Ball surveillance aircraft and was the first successful test of an ASCM. The new cruise missile was believed to have a longer range than the Silkworm of as much as 120 km with better guidance technology, but Pentagon officials described it as “unimpressive, old technology.”

North Korea fired an ASCM into the Sea of Japan on the eve of the South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun’s inauguration. The missile was classified as a KN-01 or Seersucker short-range missile that traveled 60 km before falling harmlessly into the water. This was the first test since North Korea imposed a moratorium on itself on long-range missile flight tests in 1998 after testing the TD-1.

Another surface-to-air ASCM, similar to the one fired in Feb. 2003, was test-launched into the Sea of Japan. U.S. and South Korean officials saw the two consecutive ASCM tests as provocative actions to get the United States’ attention.

U.S. officials believed the test was of a modified version of North Korea’s ASCM. Yasuo Fukuda, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, stated in response to the launch, “We cannot rule out that it could be a kind of demonstration.” There were also unconfirmed reports of several other test launches, including one involving a Silkworm missile.

U.S. officials confirmed reports by Japan saying that North Korea had fired two short-range missiles in the direction of China.

According to the South Korean government, North Korea  tested short-range ASCMs into the Sea of Japan in what was believed to be an annual routine military exercise. Japanese news media reported the missiles had a range of 100 to 200 km and were either modified Silkworm or KN-01 missiles.

Gordon Johndroe, a national security spokesman for the Bush administration, labeled the test of two ASCMs as “not constructive.” The South Korean government however stated that it would not harm relations with North Korea.

Three more short-range missiles were fired from North Korea’s coast according to South Korean news reports confirmed by Pentagon officials. At least one of the missiles involved a KN-02, a new solid-fueled missile with an improved precision strike ability and a range of 120 km. A series of short-range missiles were fired as North Korea issued a warning for the United States to stop “trying to cook up fictions” on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

Three short-range missiles with a range of nearly 50 km were reportedly test-fired into the sea bordering North Korea’s western border.

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Taepodong-1 Missile North Korean Army

Taepodong (TD)-1 Missile

North Korea tested a three-stage Taepodong-1, which North Korean officials said was to place its first satellite into orbit. However, U.S., Japanese, and South Korean officials saw the event as a test of a long-range missile that failed but showed North Korea’s technical capabilities to develop multiple-stage missiles. During the test, the first and second stages separated approximately 300 km and 1,380 km respectively from the launch site.

The third stage failed right before reaching orbit but surprised Western intelligence analysts who believed there would be only two stages. According to CIA national intelligence officer, Robert Walpole, the TD-1 had a range of 1,500 to 2,000 km, but this varied among TD variants. TD-1 was developed concurrently with the ND-1 in 1988. Satellite photographs showed that TD-1 consisted of the ND-1 as the first stage and the Hwasong-6 (Scud) as the second stage.

North Korea drew international criticism once again for firing a series of short-range missiles off its east coast. On July 2, 2009, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles, which were followed by seven missiles launched on July 4, 2009. South Korean military officials reported that the test-firings on the U.S.

Independence Day involved Scud and No Dong (or Rodong) ballistic missiles that flew about 240-310 miles off North Korea’s eastern coast into the sea separating Japan and North Korea, according to South Korea’s Yonhap news agency.

The missile tests had been expected as North Korea declared a nosail zone from June 25 to July 10 in order to conduct military drills, but South Korea and Japan called these military exercises a provocative act that violated a U.N. Security Council resolution barring the rogue nation from conducting missile-launch activities. Britain and France issued similar statements, while Russia and China called all sides to remain calm and urged North Korea to return to the six-party talks. These missile tests came after the U.N. Security Council imposed new sanctions prompted by North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25, 2009.

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The Hwasong-6 is a North Korean Tactical Ballistic Missile

Hwasong-6 Missile Import By Russia Scud-C Missile

North Korea conducted its first test launch of the Hwasong-6 missile from the Musudan-ri launch facility. Earlier reports suggested that the first test actually took place in May 1986, but these events were not confirmed. The 1990 test was reported to be a successful launch.

Hwasong-6 Missile Or Scud-C

 The Hwasong-6 was an indigenously made version of the Soviet-made Scud-C missile and an upgrade of the Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) missile. The upgrade included an increase in the missile’s range to nearly 500 to 600 km. Low-scale production of the Hwasong-6 was believed to have started in 1989, which then went under full-scale production following missile tests in 1990 and 1991.

Hwasong-6 Missile

The second test of the Scud-C was fired from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) from a Korean People’s Army (KPA) base in Kangwon-do province. This test was also believed to have been a success and had a range of about 500 km.

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North Korea Military Hwasong-5 Missile

Hwasong-5 Missile Or Scud-B

The Hwasong-5 missile was a reverse-engineered version of the Soviet-made Scud-B missile that North Korea received from Egypt between 1976 and 1981. In 1984, six tests of the Hwasong-5 missile were reportedly conducted with three successes and three failures in April and September. It was believed that missile production began in 1986 following these tests.

Hwasong-5 Missile

Four missiles were reportedly launched from the Musudan-ri launch facility without any notification to the international community. At least one or two Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 missiles and one ND-1 missile were test-launched.

Hwasong-5 Or Scud-b

During the test, the missiles were apparently fired at a target buoy in the direction of Japan’s peninsula, which Japan saw as a direct threat to its security. U.S. officials were unable to determine whether any of the missile tests were successful, but it was believed that the ND-1 traveled 500 km and one Hwasong missile traveled 100 km. The other two Hwasong missiles were unable to reach the 100 km mark.

North Korea Hwasong-5 Missile

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North Korea's Taepodong 2 Nuclear Missile

North KoreaTapodong 2 Missile Launcher

North Korea launched a series of short- and medium-range missiles, including one long-range Taepodong-2 ballistic missile. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) determined that the tests were not a threat to the United States.

Taepodong 2 Missile

 The TD-2 failed 40 seconds after the launch, but it caused worry among foreign governments because the TD-2 had an estimated range of 3,600 to 4,300 km. North Korea’s neighbors and the United States condemned the tests and Japan sought an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider penalties. Ri Pyong Dok, a North Korean Foreign Ministry official, stated in response to international protests, “The missile launch is an issue that is entirely within our sovereignty. No one has the right to dispute it." In September 2006, the Japanese and Australian governments imposed economic sanctions on North Korea.

North Korea launched a three-stage rocket in what North Korean officials said would place its Kwangmyongsong-2 satellite into space. Pak Tok Hun, North Korea’s deputy UN ambassador, responded to international protest of the launch by saying, “Every country has the right, the inalienable right, to use the outer space peacefully” and it was “not democratic” for the Security Council to prevent North Korea from its launch activities.

According to NORAD and the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), “stage one of the missile fell into the Sea of Japan. The remaining stages, along with the payload itself, landed in the Pacific Ocean” and “no object entered orbit.” On April 13, 2009, the U.N. Security Council condemned North Korea’s rocket launch and stated that further launch activities would result in sanctions.

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