China Defense HJ-73 Anti Tank Guide Missile And Variant Series HJ-8 ATGM

HJ-73 is a short-ranged ATGM built to replace the AT-3 Sagger in some roles in Chinese service. The Chinese felt that the Sagger was too heavy a system for general use in their army, and so developed a lighter, more portable system. The HJ-73 is also fired from vehicles in place of the Sagger. Later the Chinese developed an improved version, the HJ-73B, using a more advanced SACLOS interface and a better missile; however, the HJ-73B was only a stopgap measure until the HJ-8 production ramped up, and it is the rarest version of the HJ-73. The HJ-73C is a rather new development; it totally gives up the joystick controls, only requiring the gunner to keep the target in the crosshairs, and adds thermal imaging. It is also capable of firing AT-3 Sagger missiles of all types, giving it an even greater degree of flexibility.

HJ-8 Launcher Missile, HJ-8C MISSILE, HJ-8E ATGMISSILE AND HJ-8L ATGMISSILE

HJ-8 is a newer ATGM also designed to be fired from tripods and vehicle mounts, and from helicopters. It usually replaces AT-3 and AT-4 missiles on Chinese vehicles, and has also been exported to several Mideast countries and to Yugoslavia. The basic HJ-8 launcher is similar to the TOW-1 launcher. Along with the HJ-8C missile, an upgraded launcher was introduced with an image intensifier for night use. When the HJ-8E missile was introduced, a new launcher that replaces the image intensifier with thermal imaging was also introduced. The latest version of the launcher came with the HJ-8L missile; it has a periscope that allows
the gunner to fire and guide the weapon from a prone position.

HJ-83 ATGM

HJ-8 ATGM

HJ-8L ATGM

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China DF-41 Ballistic Missile System Capacity Nuclear Weapons

The DF-41 is a three-stage, solid fuel missile that will potentially be able to reach targets anywhere in the continental United States. As with the DF-31, this missile will most likely eventually be armed with as many as
three MRV or MIRVed warheads with yields of perhaps 50–90 kilotons each. The DF-41 will probably be hidden in caves like many other of China’s nuclear weapons, but will be road-, rail- or river-mobile. It is presumably intended to replace the aging DF-5 force, which Beijing will begin replacing around 2010.

In the absence of flight testing, the final operational configuration of this solid fueled missile remains uncertain, particularly with respect to the length of the third stage. However, this derivative of the DF-31 would be unlikely to have a throwweight in excess of 1000 kgs, and most estimates are in the range of 800 kg. Some estimates anticipate that, as with previous Chinese ICBMs, the DF-41 will carry only a single warhead [with a 0.35 - 1.0 MT yield]. In any event, depending on the weapon's yield, it seems unlikely that China would be able to mount more than a few lower-yield [50-100 KT ?] RVs on this ICBM. The American Minuteman III has 3 RVs and a throwweight of 1100 kgs at 12,900 kms, while the MX Peacekeeper carries 10 RVs and has a throwweight of 3950 kgs at 11,000 kms. Both American missiles carry warheads with yields of a few hundred kilotons.

The DF-41 missile program was officially initiated in July 1986, but has never undergone flight-testing. This has led some to believe that the DF-41 program has been either suspended or cancelled.

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China Produce DF-15 SRBM, DF-25 And DF-31 Full GPS Guide Technology Missile

Df-15 Missile, DF-25 Missile and DF-31 Missile

The CSS-6/DF-15/M-9 is a single-stage, solid fuel, mobile SRBM originally developed for export, as indicated by the M-designation. Only after China pledged not to export these missiles were they incorporated into the Chinese inventory. The DF-15 has been deployed with the Second Artillery since 1995. It is launched from a truck-pulled trailer with a preparation time of 30 minutes and has a strap-down inertial guidance system with an on-board computer. A miniature propulsion system on the warhead can correct the missile’s terminal velocity, reentry attitude, flight trajectory, and range.

This control significantly improves the DF-15s accuracy and penetration and would likely complicate missile defense radar tracking, computations, and interception. The DF-15 also has a detachable warhead, thus presenting a much smaller target than more primitive SRBMs, such as the Scud missiles produced by North Korea (see Table 8.5). Moreover, GPS technology has probably been employed to further improve its
accuracy. Although the missile has been promoted with a CEP of 300 meters, its actual accuracy is probably much greater, perhaps 50 meters or less.

Armed with a unitary, high explosive warhead, the DF-15 could create a crater as large as 30 to 50 meters in diameter. Although originally designed to deliver conventional explosives, the DF-15 is probably also nuclearcapable. To diversify China’s theater ballistic missile inventory, a conventional version of the CSS-6/DF-15/M-9, with a 1,200 km range, is reportedly under development. This range would permit a faster reentry speed to counter lower-tier missile defense systems and enable the missile to be fired at Taiwan from a missile base in Huaihua, Hunan province.

The DF-25 was conceived as a two-stage, land-mobile, solidfueled missile with a 2,000 kg payload likely intended to deliver a large conventional warhead to a distance of 1,700 km using an inertial guidance
system. The missile was probably intended as a tactical weapon for use in the South China Sea dispute over the Spratly Islands. There were no reports of any test firings of the DF-25 before its cancellation.

The DF-31 is a three-stage, land-mobile, solid-fuel missile. The DF-31 will be China’s next generation ICBM, along with the DF-41. It could reach targets throughout Asia as well as Hawaii, Alaska, and the western continental United States. The missile is presumably intended to replace the liquid fuel DF-4. After considerable delay, the DF-31 was first flight tested in August 1999, reportedly with decoys or penetration aids designed to defeat missile defenses. A second test was reportedly conducted in December 1999, and at least one source states that a third test was conducted on November 4, 2000.

Some reports have suggested that China has developed or is developing multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for the DF-31, perhaps with yields as small as 100–200 kilotons each. While its origins are uncertain, the DF-31 likely derived from the DF-23. Begun in 1978, The DF-23 development program set out to build a land-based, road-mobile, solid-fueled missile. Instead, they created the submarine-launched JL-2 (see below). The land-based version of the DF-23 was renamed the DF-31 in January 1985. It is expected to be deployed within the next several years.

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China Made JL-2 Nuclear Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile In Mission Target

 JL-2 SLBM on Jin-Class SSBN Each Jin-class SSBN is expected to be armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). DOD estimates that these missiles will enter service in 2009 or 2010,22 and that they will have a range of 7,200 kilometers (about 3,888 nautical miles).23 Such a
range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack.

• targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions close to China;24
• targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle) from locations south of Japan;
• targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii; and
• targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii.

China’s submarine modernization effort, which is producing a significantly more modern and capable submarine force, has attracted substantial attention and concern. The August 2009 ONI report states that “since the mid-1990s, the PRC has emphasized the submarine force as one of the primary thrusts of its military modernization effort.”

China by the end of 2006 completed taking delivery on eight Russian-made Kilo-class nonnuclear powered attack submarines (SSs) that are in addition to four Kilos that China purchased from Russia in the 1990s. China also has recently built or is building four other classes of submarines, including the following:

• a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design called the Jin class or Type 094;
• a new nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the Shang class or Type 093;16
• a new SS design called the Yuan class or Type 041 (or Type 039A);17 and
• another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song class or Type 039/039G.

Along with the Kilo-class boats, these four classes of indigenous submarines are regarded as much more modern and capable than China’s aging older-generation submarines.18 At least some of these new submarine designs are believed to have benefitted from Russian submarine technology and design know-how.

The August 2009 ONI report includes a graph that shows a new Type 095 SSN, along with the date 2015, which might be the year that ONI projects that this submarine will enter service. The graph shows that this submarine is projected be quieter than the Shang-class SSN, and also quieter than the Russian Victor III-class SSN, which entered service in the late 1970s, but not as quiet as the Russian Akula I-class SSN, which entered service in the late 1980s.

I think PLA built this sub as a counter measure to American nuke-sub, but Japanese seems get a bit anxious about it. One Japanese media said Chinese has successfully tested a the JL-2 missile which has a range of 8000km to 12000km in March 2005.

China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. China’s eight recently delivered Kilos are reportedly armed with the highly capable SS-N-27 Sizzler ASCM. In addition to other weapons, Shang-class SSNs may carry LACMs. Although ASCMs are often highlighted as sources of concern, wake-homing torpedoes can also be very difficult for surface ships to counter.

Although China’s aging Ming-class (Type 035) submarines are based on old technology and are much less capable than China’s newer-design submarines, China may decide that these older boats have continued value as minelayers or as bait or decoy submarines that can be used to draw out enemy submarines (such as U.S. SSNs) that can then be attacked by more modern PLA Navy submarines.

Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, the total number of domestically produced submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 is 26, or an average of 2.0 per year. This average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steadystate force of domestically produced submarines of 40 to 60 boats of all kinds, again assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.

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Global Strike HN-2000 The Chinese Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

Anti-Ship Cruise Missile HN-2000 With Millimeter Wave Radar, Infrared Image Mapping, Laser Radar, Synthetic-Aperture Radar (SAR)

China is currently developing its next-generation cruise missile, the Hong Niao-2000 (HN-2000). This missile will reportedly be equipped with millimeter wave radar, infrared image mapping, laser radar, synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) and the Chinese Beidou satellite guidance system, for accuracies of 1-3 meters. This missile will also incorporate the latest stealth technologies and have a supersonic terminal flight phase, with an expected range of 4,000km.

Highly-detailed, authoritative Chinese sources have shed light on the direction of China’s future cruise missile development and underscore the importance of cruise missiles in Chinese strategic thinking. One such article revealed interest in “super long range” and intercontinental cruise missiles with striking distances of 5,000 to 8,000 km and over 8,000 km, respectively. This article, a product of CASIC’s Third Academy, also revealed a strong interest in using long-range cruise missiles with a supersonic terminal phase to attack U.S. aircraft carriers, and discussed ways to defeat U.S. air defense. China has studied U.S. air defense capabilities and techniques in great detail, and is working hard on finding ways to defeat them in conjunction with the Second Academy.


China has also studied the U.S. common aero vehicle (CAV) program in great detail, and is looking at combining elements of both cruise and ballistic missile technology to develop a “Qian Xuesen Missile” for anti-ship and global strike missions. While the U.S. Navy is deeply concerned by China’s evolving ASBM program, much less attention has been paid to the role that cruise missile technology featured in the ASBM program or the fact that China is developing long-range cruise missiles such as the DH-2000 for anti-carrier strikes as well.

Recent unconfirmed Chinese reports state that the PLA Navy (PLAN) has deployed large numbers of long-range cruise missiles to the South China Sea for the purpose of “dealing with” U.S. carriers. And one Chinese journalist writing on behalf of the PLA Daily, Li Wenqi, reportedly left an interview with Third Academy researchers convinced that the success of the DH-10’s recent flight test meant that China now had a long-range, anti-carrier weapon.

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Chinese Modernization Hong Niao HN-1 and HN-3 Cruise Missile Technologies

Hong Niao-1 (HN-1), HN-2 and HN-3 longer-range

This evolved into the Hong Niao-1 (HN-1), which began development in 1988, and later the longer-range Hong Niao-2 (HN-2), which was first thought to have been tested in either 1995 or 1997, with a ground-launched test in August 2001. The HN-2 is more commonly known as the DH-10, and is modeled on existing U.S. and Russian technologies.

The DH-10 is based largely on U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile technologies obtained by aggressive PLA buyers in Iraq, Serbia and Afghanistan and elsewhere U.S. Tomahawks, or parts thereof, have been lost. China is reported to have acquired at least two unexploded Tomahawk missiles from Osama bin Laden after the U.S. fired 75 Tomahawks into Afghanistan on August 20, 1998 in a failed attempt to kill him.

Aside from reverse engineering U.S. technology, China’s DH-10 has also thought to have benefited from an improved turbofan engine based upon the Russian TRDD-50 engine used in the SS-N-21 and AS-15 missiles, which began manufacture in China after 1992. China’s procurement of at least six Kh-55 Russian Raduga cruise missiles from Ukraine in the 1990s is also thought to have provided key technology for the development of the DH-10.

It has also been reported that in 1992 China established the Xinxin Factory in Shanghai with Russian expertise and equipment to develop air and submarine launched LACMs. Similarly, it has been alleged that in 1995 China hired and moved a Russian design team to Shanghai as part of a cruise missile manufacturing technology procurement effort which opened the door to the transfer of radar and infrared signature-reduction technology. These reports suggest that Shanghai has played an important role in the development of China’s second and third generation LACMs, though the claims are yet to be validated.


It is known that the Hong Niao-3 (HN-3) or DH-10A, a stealthier, more accurate HN-2 upgrade, was successfully tested on August 10, 2004. The DH-10A is reported to have a circular error probability of less than 10 meters, and relies on a combination internal navigation system (INS), global positioning system (GPS) and terrain comparison (TERCOM) for guidance. It has gone into mass production and is deployed with the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps.

The latest generation DH-10A is also believed to be deployed on China’s H-6K bomber, a re-engined and improved variant of the Xian H-6 that has six underwing hardpoints to carry large air-to-surface missiles. Images released on the Chinese internet show the H-6K carrying missiles roughly the same size and shape as the Tomahawk, with a “pinched” nose cone profile like the Tomahawk Block IV, making it more stealthy.

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China Miliatry Forces The Dong Feng 21 Anti Ship Ballistic Missile

Dong Feng-21(DF-21) ASBM The Missile’s Mission

There is little doubt that a variant of the Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) missile is the candidate for the ASBM. Moreover, much of the work to adapt the DF-21 for such a mission appears to have been developed in the late 1990s, such as an ablative shield against aerodynamic heating during reentry, vibration resistance, and optimization of the payload. There is also discussion of adding a third stage to the missile, not only to increase its range but to provide extra maneuverability in midcourse fl ight (discussed below). The third stage appears to be in development, although several documents suggest that the missile and its maneuvering capabilities remain in the early research and experimental stages.

Chinese sources go into detail about various methods of maneuvering during a ballistic missile’s midcourse phase. Maneuvering increases the missile’s terminal target-seeking coverage so as to hit a moving target at sea. However, the impact of U.S. missile defenses primarily the sea-based Aegis system equipped with SM-3, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor on the missile’s survivability is also discussed. A number of measures are suggested to defeat them.

Altering the missile’s fl ight path by employing a wavelike trajectory rather than a traditional parabolic fl ight path is one method. In this scenario, the additional third stage of the DF-21 missile, with its hybrid liquid-solid fuel booster, is ignited several times to effect several wave patterns in the missile’s midcourse fl ight. Other methods include weaving, spiraling, spinning, and gliding—all of which would alter the traditional parabolic fl ight path of the ballistic missile and boost the missile’s penetration capabilities against American missile defenses, which depend heavily on prediction of a missile’s fl ight trajectory.

Controlled maneuvering in space should not be a “bottleneck technology,” according to one source, since China has already demonstrated real progress in “orbital maneuvering and docking” under the Shenzhou program. However, other publications suggest that research and experiments involving wave and gliding trajectories began only in 2003, de novo, and there is no evidence that China has made breakthroughs in this area. Moreover, the academic treatments of these exo-atmospheric maneuvers appear to be largely theoretical in nature. For instance, they do not systematically address the problem of how to “maintain guidance [for the target] during the whole trajectory,” which other articles insist is a technical challenge China must overcome.

 China has already demonstrated many of the core technologies required for such a system. While adapting off-the-shelf technologies to an ASBM system is both logical progression and feasible, the literature appears ambiguous as to their application to a new environment (penetrating missile defenses) and an evolved mission (hitting a moving target at sea).

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China Military Forces DF-11A Conventional Ballistic Missile

However, a close reading of an interview he gave with the Chinese media reveals that Liu Shiquan is not the father of the Chinese cruise missile, but of the DF-11A (DongFeng-11A) SRBM. 8 The DF-11A, an extended range, more accurate variant of the DF-11, was first fielded by the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps in 1999,9 and remains the Ninth Academy’smain product.

Liu Shiquan’s deep involvement in the ballistic missile field is also further suggested by his lead role in the 2003 publishing of a four hundred page book entitled “Techniques for Defeating Ballistic Missile Defense,” which discusses the development of ballistic missile defense (BMD), and the many ways in which ballistic missiles can defeat BMD shields.

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China’s DH-10 Cruise Missile Program

China Made DongHai-10/DH-10 Missile

Yet at both the tactical and strategic levels, China’s latest generation of cruise missiles have very serious implications for regional security in the Western Pacific and beyond. Like China’s highly successful ballistic missile systems, cruise missiles allow for stand-off strikes that are technologically challenging (and expensive) to defend against. However, unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are able to strike from any direction and fly at very low altitudes, making them even harder to detect and defend against.

Cruise missiles are also far more accurate and inexpensive to build than ballistic missiles and, because of their relatively small size, can be launched from a wide variety of platforms, furthering their stealth and agility. They also represent a major proliferation risk given China’s past willingness to sell cruise missiles to unsavory regimes and the missiles’ compatibility with a wide variety of warheads, including tactical nuclear weapons.


However, what truly makes this particular Chinese cruise missile program notable is that after more than two decades of development and testing, the DH-10 has entered production and deployment at break-neck speeds. It also appears that the development of the DH-10 may have unlocked key technologies that have implications for China’s highly-valued anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) program.

The DH-10 Cruise Missile

There is a great deal of opacity surrounding China’s DH-10 land attack cruise missile (LACM) in the available literature. For instance, a recent report from the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) states the launch mode, range and deployment of the DH-10 are all “undetermined.”

Yet, in 2008 the Department of Defense (DOD) estimated the DH-10 to have a range of over 2,000 kilometers (km), and pointed out that the PLA was developing both air and ground launched variants.2 The latest 2009 DOD estimates state that by “April 2008 the PLA had 150-350 DH-10 ground-launched
cruise missiles” with a range of a range of over 1,500 km.3 It is not known why the DOD changed its estimates concerning the range of the DH-10 in 2009 and failed to make anyestimates concerning the number of air-launched DH-10s inthe PLA inventory.

The lack of a precise estimate suggests that the DOD knows much less about the status of China’s cruise missiles than it does China’s ballistic missile systems. 4 Notably, the DOD report does not even attempt an estimate at the number of air-launched or possible sea-launched variants of the DH-10.

It is possible that the Pentagon’s difficulty in making precise assessments of the DH-10 program stems from the unusually high level of secrecy that surrounds this program, and the fact that so much of the already limited Chinese source material available on the subject appears to be part of a misinformation campaign. One example of this can be seen in the wide-scale, apparently intentional, confusion of the DH- 10 LACM program and the DF-11 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) program on the Chinese internet.


 The DH-10 is widely reported on the Chinese language internet to be a product of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s (CASIC) Ninth Academy (also known as the Sanjiang Aerospace Group, or 066 Base) in Hubei, China.5 According to these reports, the chief designer of the DH-10
and “Father of China’s cruise missile” is the Ninth Academy’s Party Committee Secretary and Vice President Liu Shiquan.

In terms of known ground-launched DH-10 deployments, the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps has formed at least two operational, road-mobile, DH-10 Brigades: the 821 Brigade, 96215 Unit in Liuzhou, Guangxi Province; and the 824 Brigade, 96317 Unit in Dongkou, Hunan Province.30 There are also unconfirmed reports of a third DH-10 Brigade in Jianshui, Yunnan Province. These DH-10 Brigades target Okinawa,
Taiwan, South East Asia and the South China Sea area. Given their locations, it appears that China has intentionally positioned these missiles far inland in order to maximize their protection against detection and counter-strikes.

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