IRANIAN GLOBAL SECURITY SHAHAB-3 MISSILE VARIANT MRBM

Regional actors, such as North Korea in Northeast Asia and Iran and Syria in the Middle East, have short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. forces, allies, and partners in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships. North Korea conducted seven widely publicized ballistic missile launches on July 4–5, 2006. It successfully tested six mobile theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating a capability to target U.S. and allied forces in South Korea and Japan. On July 3–4, 2009, it again exercised its capability to threaten U.S. and allied forces and populations in South Korea and Japan by launching seven ballistic missiles. North Korea has developed an advanced solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). A mobile IRBM is also under development.

Iran also presents a significant regional missile threat. It has developed and acquired ballistic missiles capable of striking deployed forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. It is fielding increased numbers of mobile regional ballistic missiles and has claimed that it has incorporated anti-missile-defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile forces.

Iran has an extensive missile development program and has received support in the past from entities in Russia, China, and North Korea. DIA believes that Iran still depends on outside sources for many of the related dualuse raw materials and components; for example, the Shahab-3 MRBM is based on the North Korean No Dong missile. Iran continues to modify this missile to extend its range and effectiveness. In 2004,
Iran claimed that it tested an improved version of the Shahab-3; subsequent statements by Iranian officials suggest that the improved Shahab-3’s range is up to 2,000 kilometers and that Iran has the ability to mass-produce these missiles. In addition, Iran’s solid-propellant rocket and missile programs are progressing, and Iran has flight-tested a new solid-propellant MRBM with a claimed range of 2,000 kilometers. Iran is also likely working to improve the accuracy of its SRBMs.

Syria also presents a regional threat. It has several hundred SCUD-class and SS-21 SRBMs and may have chemical warheads available for a portion of its SCUD missiles. All of Syria’s missiles are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country.
The commitment of the United States to defend against ballistic missile capabilities from North Korea and Iran stems from the U.S. perception, shared by our allies and partners, that they are threatening. North Korea and Iran have shown contempt for international norms, pursued illicit weapons programs in defiance of the international community, and have been highly provocative in both their actions and statements. They have exploited the capabilities available to them to threaten others.

Their neighbors and the United States may be limited in their actions and pursuit of their interests if they are vulnerable to North Korean or Iranian missiles. Deterrence is a powerful tool, and the United States is seeking to strengthen deterrence against these new challenges. But deterrence by threat of a strong offensive response may not be effective against

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Iranian Army Transfer of it Advanced Solid Propellant Technology to North Korea

Iranian transfer of it advanced solid propellant technology to North Korea is a serious concern along with what it has already received from Russia that does not stand up when considering the understood state of North Korea's solid propellant ballistic missile program even if they are benefiting from Iran's extensive efforts in that area of ballistic missile technology development.

The advanced nature of the system comes from the fact that the warning time for these missiles has been greatly reduced to mere minutes from that available through the existing liquid propellant Shahab-3 series of hours in preparation. This constitutes a major strategic threat to the regions with its range performance capability. This says nothing of the known to be deployed liquid propellant 4,000 kilometer range No-dong-B never displayed or paraded by Iran . No-dong-B is deployed both in Iran and North Korea .

Finally on January 29, 2007 the US government acknowledged for the first time the existence of several new Iranian and North Korean missiles under development through a speech by the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency of the Pentagon Army Brig. General Patrick O’Reilly before the George C. Marshall Institute. In that speech he described the Iranian multi stage Ghadr-101 with a 750-800-1000 km range and the two-three stage Ghadr-110 (Ashura) solid propellant missile with a range of (1,324 miles) 1,995.16 or close to 2,000 kilometers. It has been known that the Iranians are working on the Ghadr-101 as well as the Ghadr-110 (Ashura) solid propellant missiles.

The Ghadr-101, 110 solid motor development was completed in 2005. He also described the two stage Taep’o-dong-2C/3 as having a range of (6,200 Miles) 9,975.8 kilometers and the three stage version with a range of (9,300 miles) 14,963.7 kilometers with a 200-250 kg warhead. He went further in his slides
presentation to show that the liquid propellant No-dong-B/Mirim has a demonstrated range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers. (24) The Nodong-B was described as “a qualitative improvement in the performance” from earlier North Korean missile systems. The Iranian Ghadr-101, 110, 110A will in fact also provides Iran with an ASAT capability besides its operational MRBM and IRBM capability.

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Iran Army Made Sejil-1 Goes Operational With its Family of Solid Propellant Ballistic Missile System

Iran made it official that as expected it has started the early deployment in 2008 of its operational solid propellant strategic ballistic missiles. The Samen/Ghadr-101 single stage missile with a 750-800 kilometer range was quietly recently paraded in Tehran , Iran on Sunday September 21, 2008 . The deployment also includes two variants of the Ghadr-110, 110A ballistic missile intended replacement for the Shahab-3A, 3B and 3C liquid propellant ballistic missiles with a 2,000 kilometer range. However the Ghadr-110/Sejjil (baked
clay) two stage solid propellant missile flown on November 10, 2008 has a range of 2,000 to perhaps 2,500 kilometers but previously Iran has flight tested the Ghadr-110A Ashura three stage ballistic missile with a range capability of 2,500 to as much as 3,000 kilometers.

This is depending on its warhead payload mass and staging configuration. The entire development flight tests of the Ghadr-101, 110, 110A series missiles has been carried out in country with little or no announcements until they have become operational if any announcement at all. At present it is apparent that the Ghadr-110/Sejjil is being deployed in its 2,000-2,510 kilometer range version with a 650-1,000 kg triconic warhead. That tri-conic "baby bottle nose" warhead and its dimensions fits in the same logistic envelop as the Shahab-3B, 3C series lands mobile TEL's. All of these solid propellant missiles use some liquid propellant systems for stage propulsion in flight attitude steering control in place of steering gimbals mounted nozzles.

This solid propellant ballistic missile series was developed and produced under the leadership of the Air and Space Organization (aerospace) Department of the Iranian, Ministry of Defense. Ghadr-110 systems heritage clearly has a link to the Pakistani Shaheen-II class system. The full heritage goes back to not merely China ’s M-18, DF-21 that in turn came from Republic of South Africa ’s RSA-2, RSA-3 strategic boosters SLV’s which Israel also benefited from.

The flight was launched by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unit as an operational system in a military exercise on November 10, 2008 from the newly excavated site on the outskirts of the city of Marivan in the western province of Kurdistan which borders Iraq . It is believed that the missile was fired intentionally into the Semnan range Dasht-e Kavir ( Salt Desert ) and was therefore not launched full range.

In classical Iranian fashion as aptly demonstrated the warhead exploded after covering 180 miles (~288 km) plus terminating the flight according to US Military Intelligence sources and methods as reported by the Associated Press. These Intelligence sources further suggested that the flight lasted only 9 seconds as it was reported or more likely 90 seconds but the reviewed videos clearly shows it went well beyond 35 seconds showing no anomalies.

Whether it intentionally veered off course or was programmed to accomplish this as it was reported will require a careful review of the telemetry captured by intelligence means from the full range observation. Based on this and other similar design related heritage systems performance data suggest that the Sejjil did indeed complete its two stage burn cycles successfully before exploding the warhead at altitude if that is what it was. That South African Republic and Pakistani, Chinese heritage related information says that the two stage burn was in the 107-121 seconds total with a slant angle performance of 272 kilometers while the Iran system using a smaller diameter solid motor was 180 miles (~288 km) plus down range well beyond the two stage burn cycle of the Sejjil missile system. If nothing else the explosion could have been nothing more than the second stage burn termination blowout port popping the top of the motor plate to kill the pressure during the warhead separation.

If the motors are a little smaller in diameter as they seem to be 1.35 meters verses 1.4 meters the burns could have been a little shorter also. If it was an explosion it was after the end of the second stage burn if at all. By firing the missile the way it was apparently flown with an already proven warhead design flown over a
range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers strongly suggest it was not intended to be a full range demonstration. All of these solid propellant missiles are believed to have been flight test demonstrated in the past in country with no fan
fair.

All of the pre-unannounced launches were apparently covered by U. S. , DSP satellite sensors and other technical means. Not all of the in country flights were successful which is to be expected. One example of this is the previous Ashura-110A experimental flight which is known to have been a partial failure but subsequent flights performed better. That means as Iran said Iran was successful with the launch. That was a very serious demonstration of a new operational strategic system that is a much more serious threat to the region under its range performance.

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Iranian Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Produce Sejil-2 Balistic Missile Sysytem

The Sajjil [also known as "Sejjil" or "Sejil"] is a two-stage, primary solidpropellan with liquid propellant attitude control systems, surface-to-surface missile produced by Iran . The word is taken from a verse of Koran and it’s about a foreign army attacking Kaaba ( Mecca ). The story says that small birds appeared in the sky caring small pebbles of "baked clay" (SAJJIL) and dropped them on the enemy, killing them. Sajjil means stone mixed with mud. In Arabic, 'jim' is equivalent to 'ghaf' in Persian. Singue is hence spelled Sinj. The word Sajjil is then an Arabisation of a Persian term.

The Fars news agency reported 12 November 2008 that Iran had successfully test fired a new surface-to-surface missile. "The missile test launch is within the framework of defense strategy and conventional missile activities of Iran, it is merely intended for defense purposes and strengthening peace and stability in the region," Fars quoted Defense Minister Brigadier General Mustafa Mohammad Najjar as saying. "It will not be used against any country," he said. Najjar said the Sajjil missile's range is about 2,000-2,510 km (1,200-1,560 miles).

He said the two-stage missile burns solid fuel. The flight was launched by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unit as an operational system in a military exercise on November 10, 2008 from the newly excavated site on the outskirts of the city of Marivan in the western province of Kurdistan which borders Iraq.

It is believed that the missile was fired intentionally into the Semnan range Dasht-e Kavir (Salt Desert ) and was therefore not launched full range. All subsequent flights have come from the Semnan range. On 20 May 2009 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran had test-fired a new advanced missile with a range of about 1,200 miles, far enough to strike Israel and southeastern Europe . "Defense Minister (Mostafa Mohammad
Najjar) has informed me that the Sajjil-2 missile, which has very advanced technology, was launched from Semnan and it landed precisely on the target," state radio quoted Ahmadinejad as saying.

Secretary Gates confirmed the Iranian test during an appearance before a House of Representatives committee. "The information that I have read indicates that it was a successful flight test," he said. "The missile will have a range of approximately 2,000 to 2,500 kilometers. Because of some of the problems they've had with their engines, we think, at least at this stage of the testing, it's probably closer to the lower end of that range. Whether it hit the target that it was intended for, I have not seen any information on that.

A subsequent successful test firing of the production prototype of Sejjil took place on Sept 28, 2009. It has been suggested that there have been at least four flight of the Sejjil solid propellant missile including at a minimum one in country unannounced. The have also been at least two firings of the longer range Ashura missile.

Iran followed this launch on December 16, 2009 from its Semnan range with an Iranian, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unit army operation test launch of the land mobile fixed site green colored Sejjil-2 with warhead impact explosion of a none nuclear conventional explosion apparently being displayed. The Sejjil-2 has an demonstrated range capability of 2,510 kilometers with its 650 kilogram tri-conic warhead re-entry vehicle design. It can also carry a 1,000 kilogram wargead tp 2,000 kilometers.

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Iran Launched Safir Satellite

On February 2, 2009 Iran launched a satellite weighing 27 kilograms using the Safir Omid two-stage rocket. Iran describes the Safir as a space-launch vehicle. Photographs of the Safir upper rocket stage used to inject the satellite into orbit suggest that the Safir could not be used as a ballistic missile to carry nuclear warheads to significant ranges. The rocket motors used in this upper stage do not have enough thrust to efficiently offset the additional gravitational force that would act on the upper stage when it carries a heavy warhead payload (in this case, payloads of 500 to 1000 kg, rather than 27 kg).

The inability of the upper stage's low-thrust rocket motors to offset gravitational forces and the very light construction of the stage, would likely limit the ability to accelerate the upper rocket stage and its heavier payload to the higher speeds needed to achieve significant range increases over a one-stage vehicle. However, as noted earlier in this chapter, Iran has demonstrated that it could develop a new or modified upper rocket stage based on SCUD rocket technology that would make it possible for the Safir to deliver a 1000 kg warhead to ranges of about 2000 km.

The first stage of the Safir launch vehicle is derived from the Shahab 3 airframe. The first stage fuel and oxidizer tanks are extended to increase the fuel load of the first stage by about 60 percent relative to that of the Shahab 3. Photographs released by Iran of the second stage propulsion section shows what appears to be two vernier rocket engines and a turbopump exhaust nozzle that look like they have been salvaged from a dismantled Russian SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile. These photographs suggest that the upper
stage of the Safir uses a powerful and energetic fuel combination, N2O4 and UDMH (Nitogen Tetroxide and Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine), which allows for rocket motors with high exhaust velocities relative to those based on SCUD technology. Information derived from Iran’s successful launch of a satellite
weighing 27 kg makes it possible to estimate possible performance characteristics of this upper stage.

Additional photographs published by the Iranian Space Agency show that the satellite was powered by three banks of 15 standard D-sized batteries. It also had an onboard computer module, separate UHF transmitter and receiver modules, and other circuitry, all of which appear to have been constructed from electronic
components manufactured by Western companies. For example, two Dallas Semiconductor Corporation 64 kb static random access memory chips (SRAM) and microwave signal splitting devices from the Mini-Circuits company can be readily identified from the photographs. This satellite is therefore derived from commonly available commercial electronic components, none of which could possibly be manufactured by Iran. A very rough estimate of the weights of these different components leads to the conclusion that the satellite might well weigh the 27 kg reported by Iran.

We have reasonable estimates of the performance characteristics of the first rocket stage, which is basically derived from the technologies used to build the Nodong missile and its variants (like, for example, the Shahab-3M). The first stage carries a heavy payload during its powered flight (the fully fueled second stage and the satellite) and burns out at a relatively low altitude and velocity (about 2.1 km/s at an altitude of 68 km). As a result, the exact performance characteristics of the first stage do not strongly affect the overall ability of the two stage rocket to place the satellite into orbit (the required orbital speed for the satellite is roughly 7.7 km/s). If the rocket can place the satellite into orbit, almost all of the velocity needed to achieve this result must come from the second stage.

Hence, the information about the orbital characteristics of the Omid satellite makes it possible to estimate the total velocity capability of the second stage. This then makes it possible to estimate the performance characteristics of the upper rocket stage. These estimates can then be used to determine the possible range and payload of this rocket, or its variants, if it is employed as a ballistic missile.

At this time, there is still considerable uncertainty about the configuration of the second stage of the Safir and the actual engineering components that were used in it. In 200512 Iran reportedly bought 18 disassembled SS-N-6 (R-27) Soviet submarine launched ballistic missiles from North Korea. The R-27 utilizes Soviet
rocket technologies that were first developed in the 1960s. The propulsion system of the R-27 uses a single rocket motor that generates a thrust of 23 tons and two steering rocket thrust chambers that together generate 3 tons of thrust. The powered flight-time of the R-27 is about 120 seconds.

The two steering rocket thrust chambers are fed by a single turbopump and the fuel used by the R-27s rocket motors is Nitrogen Tetroxide and Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (N2O4 and UDMH). This propellant is much more powerful than that used by missiles based on SCUD technology. The R-27 airframe is also constructed from highstrength Aluminum alloys, which have a density almost one third that of steel.

Assuming the photographs of the Safir upper stage are not misleading, the motor would have to operate for about 274 seconds, roughly two and a half times longer than the time it is supposed to operate when used as part of the R-27. Calculations also indicate that if the Safir upper stage is capable of launching a satellite, it must have a very low empty-weight. Such a low empty-weight would almost certainly require that the stage's airframe be constructed from light-weight high-strength aluminum alloy rather than from heavy steel. The R-27 is constructed using these same materials. Such a light aluminum airframe would likely only be able to support a very light-weight payload. In addition, if payloads of hundreds of kilograms or more could be mounted on this upper stage, the lowthrust of the rocket motors could not initially offset the pull of the Earth's gravity
on the vehicle, and it would continuously lose vertical velocity during the early part of its powered flight.

These observations lead to the conclusion that the current Safir upper rocket stage is not readily adaptable to carrying a warhead of a thousand, or even hundreds of kilograms. Thus, if our observations about the Safir
upper stage are correct, the upper rocket stage used to launch the Omid satellite is only useful for launching a very light satellite into a low-earth orbit. Any further advances towards launching heavier satellites to low earth orbits, or lighter satellites to higher orbits, will require an entirely new rocket with first and second stages that are considerably larger than those used by the Safir.

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SS-N-6 Navigation Sensor System Regarding Right Target

SS-N-6  With Navigation Sensor System

There are many unconfirmed rumors and speculatse Agency, that Iran is developing a long-range solid-propellant missile called the Ashura, and an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile based on the Russian submarine launched ballistic missile known in the West as the SS-N-6. There is no good evidence at this time to support a technical analysis of Iran's solid propellant ballistic missile program, but we expect to add to, and perhaps modify, this report as new information becomes available. With regard to the SS-N-6, there is evidence that Iran has utilized the turbopump and associated vernier rocket motors (not the main rocket motor) from the SS-N-6 in the second stage of the Safir missile.

These vernier motors are of relatively low thrust, which places some limits on the weight of payloads that this upper stage can carry. The SS-N-6 vernier motors have a sufficiently high exhaust velocity relative to rocket motors based on SCUD technology to make it possible to launch a low-weight satellite into low-earth orbit. The introduction of more efficient engines that use more energetic propellants than those used by missiles based on SCUD technology is a potentially significant development and will be discussed later in this report.

Iran’s indigenous long-range liquid-propellant ballistic missile program relies very heavily on rocket motors and other missile components first imported from North Korea in the late 1980s and early 1990s. North Korea may have developed an indigenous capability to manufacture SCUD-Bs and SCUD-Cs, but the extent to which it has this capability is uncertain. The assumption that best explains the sudden appearance and the observed limitations of the North Korean missile program is that North Korea has learned to use critical rocket components, like rocket motors, to fabricate its own missiles.

These components might have been sold to North Korea by Russian groups or institutions that were operating in violation of Russian laws. North Korea probably does not have the industrial base and knowhow to improve on these components and it seems likely that they as well lack the ability to manufacture these components.

SCUD missile technology uses relatively low-energy propellants; engines with materials and designs that are very hard to upgrade to more energetic propellants; and primitive guidance systems. The fact that Iran and North Korea rely on imported technology and have not been able to develop their own rocket motors has extremely important implications for the future of Iran’s and North Korea's ballistic missile programs.

Iran and North Korea’s liquid propellant rocket programs depend heavily on the use of two rocket motors. One is the motor from the SCUD-B ballistic missile; and the other is the motor used in the North Korean Nodong missile. Both rocket motors use the same “low-energy” rocket propellants (TM-185, a mixture of 20% gasoline and 80% kerosene, and an oxidizer known as AK27, which is a mix of 27% N2O4 and 73% nitric acid). The Nodong has a bigger motor, which has more than twice the thrust of the SCUD-B motor.

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IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM A TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT SHAHAB MISSILE

Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3 Missile ICBM

Iran claims to have developed at least four different liquid-propellant ballistic missile systems, the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3, and the Ghadr-1 Kavoshgar (which is also called the Shahab-3M). Three of these missiles, the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, and Shahab-3, do not appear to be truly indigenous, as their flight
characteristics are essentially identical to those of the North Korean SCUD-B, SCUD-C, and Nodong missiles respectively.

The Shahab-1 was first presented to the world by Iran as a new ballistic missile, but Marcus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker have convincingly shown from analyses of publicly available videos of a Shahab-1 missile launch that the Shahab-1 is identical to the North Korean SCUD-B. They have also concluded that the Shahab-2 is identical to the North Korean SCUD-C, and the Shahab-3 to the North Korean Nodong. The Pakistani Ghauri-1 is also a Nodong missile purchased from North Korea. Hence the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, and Shahab-3 ballistic missiles were not developed indigenously by Iran.

 The Shahab-2, or SCUD-C, is simply a SCUD-B with "stretched" fuel tanks that can carry a warhead weighing roughly 500 kg to a range of roughly 550 km and a warhead weighing 300 kg to a range of about 650 km, roughly twice the range of the SCUD-B when it carries a 1,000 kg warhead. The North Korean
SCUD-C uses exactly the same rocket motors, turbopumps, fuel and oxidizer lines, airframe, and guidance system as the SCUD-B, but its fuel and oxidizer tanks are stretched so that it can carry about 13-14% more fuel and oxidizer than the SCUDB.


The Shahab-3 has been operationally deployed in small numbers since 2003, and Iran's efforts to improve its range and payload are exhibited in the Shahab-3M, which is derived from relatively modest modifications of the Shahab-3. Iran has also developed the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV), which was used to launch the Omid satellite into space on February 2, 2009. The Omid satellite weighs about 27 kg and was launched into a low-earth orbit with an apogee of about 320 km and a perigee of about 240 km. The Safir, which will be described and analyzed in greater detail later in this chapter, could eventually provide the basis for developing ballistic missiles of longer range and larger payload relative to those based solely on SCUD missile technologies. In this report we will refer to the missile that might be derived from the Safir SLV as the Safir missile.

Since the SCUD-C is designed to be as technologically close to the SCUD-B as possible, the warhead of the SCUD-C is lightened to about 300 to 500 kg in order to keep the overall weight of the system close to that of the original SCUD-B. A SCUD-B carrying a 300 kg warhead could reach a range of about 550 km.

Shahab-1 Missile

Ranges and payloads of the Shahab 1, Shahab 2, Shahab 3, and Shahab-3M (Ghadr-1 Kavoshgar) ballistic missiles. Assuming a payload of 1,000 kg, the estimated ranges of the four missiles are about 315, 375, 930, and 1100 km. The ranges of the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 increase to about 450 and 550 km respectively if the warhead weight is reduced from 1,000 kg to 500 kg. The range of the Shahab-3M (Ghadr-1 Kavoshgar) increases by slightly more than 200 km if the warhead is lightened from 1,000 kg to 500 kg.

Shahab-2 Missile ASBM

Shahab-3 Missile ICBM

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Iran Warns Moscow Over Failure to Deliver S-300 Missile Balistic Systems

Iran S-300 Missile System

Russia will be responsible for the consequences caused by its failure to deliver S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran, the Islamic Republic's Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said on Tuesday. In an interview with Fars News Agency he said the delivery of the airdefense systems would not violate Russian or international laws.

Moscow said last week it would freeze the delivery of S-300 systems following a new round of UN sanctions imposed on Tehran June 9. "Russia has a duty to fulfill its obligations. Implementing the S-300 deal is not against Russian laws or international regulations," Vahidi said. "It is obvious that [Russia] is responsible for the damages caused by its failure to implement the deal."

Vahidi also said that Russia would soon announce its official stance on the issue and that Iran would make no further comments until then. Vahidi said in late April Iran would produce its own missile defense systems similar to Russia's S-300 system. A Kremlin source said on June 11 the sale of S-300 air defense systems fall
under the new UN Security Council's sanctions against Tehran, but the Russian foreign minister said it was up to the president to make the final decision.

UN Security Council Resolution 1929 imposes a fourth round of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, and includes tougher financial controls and an expanded arms embargo. Russia initially said the delivery of S-300 systems to Iran would not be affected by the new UN sanctions since they are not included in the UN

Register of Conventional Arms. However, experts from the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation suggested that the S-300 system did come under the new set of sanctions.

Moscow signed a contract on supplying Iran with at least five S-300 systems in December 2005, but delivery has so far been delayed. The United States and Israel have urged Russia not to deliver the missiles to Tehran.

The S-300 contract is worth some $800 million, while Russian experts estimate the penalty for breach of contract at $400 million. The advanced version of the S-300 missile system, called S-300PMU1, has a range of over 150 kilometers (over 100 miles) and can intercept ballistic missiles and aircraft at low and high altitudes, making it effective in warding off air strikes.

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Iran Nuclear And PlutoniumTarget Set

We consider three main target facilities which if attacked could either destroy the program or delay it for some years. After analyzing the targets a damage criteria is suggested measured by the blast pressure of the weapon used. It would be safe to assume a required 5 to 10 psi which would be sufficient to either destroy or damage the facility for a long period of time. Care must be taken not to overkill for this could practically double the strike force required.

 Damage Criteria:

- 10 psi : Reinforced concrete buildings are severely damaged or demolished. Most people are killed.
- 5 psi : Most buildings collapse
- 3 psi : Residential structures collapse.

We then work out how many bombs must be dropped to cover a certain area above and below ground. To be on the safe side, we consider weapons that penetrate hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs). The Natanz facilty for instance is reported to have underground facilities where the centrifuges are installed for uranium enrichment.

Natanz facility apparently covers some 670,000 sq ft in total, the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) complex was built some 8 meters-deep into the ground and protected by a concrete wall 2.5 meters thick, itself protected by another concrete wall. By mid-2004 the Natanz centrifuge facility was hardened with a roof of several meters of reinforced concrete and buried under a layer of earth some 75 feet deep. It is reported that this facility will eventually house some 50,000 centrifuges.

The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) is an Industrial-Scale Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). The U3O8 is transported to ENTC to convert it to UF6 (Uranium Hexafluoride). The area of the buildings is estimated to be around 100,000 sq ft. and are above ground.

The Arak Facility covers an area of approximately 55,000 sq ft and contains the Heavy Water Reactor and a set of cooling towers. There are no underground facilities reported in this complex.

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Iran‘s Nuclear Facilities

Set of circumstances that could accelerate a strike on Iran‘s Nuclear Facilities :

By 2010 Iran could pose a serious threat to it‘s neighbors and Israel. Enough of an inventory of Nuclear Weapons that can serve as a deterrent against U.S. and Israeli strikes.

• A modern SAM air defense system, such as the Russian S-300PMU2 ―Favorit‖, giving Iran an advanced Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability in addition to an advanced SAM Air Defense System.

• A maritime capability that can threaten commercial shipping and Naval Forces in the Gulf , and possibly interrupt the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz.

• Having in it‘s possession highly accurate short, medium and long range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying WMD

• Train and Control a number of Counter Insurgency groups to Increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against
American interests and allies in the region and even beyond the region.

Options to deal with Iran’s Nuclear Program within the Time Frame

 - Diplomacy and Dialog:
Efforts to persuade Iran to not proliferate, and by convincing Iran that it does not face a sufficient threat to proliferate and cannot make major gains in power or security by doing so.

- Incentives:
Options that give Iran security guarantees, economic and trade advantages.

- Containment:
Creation of a mix of defensive and offensive measures that would both deny Iran the ability to exploit its
WMD capabilities and show that any effort to use such weapons to intimidate or gain military advantage would be offset by the response.

- Sanctions:
Controls and measures designed to put economic pressure on Iran, limit its access to technology, and/or
limit its access to arms.

- Regime change:
Efforts to change the regime and create one that will not proliferate.

- Defense:
A mix of measures like missile defense, air defense, counterterrorism, counter smuggling/covert operations capability, civil defense, and passive defense that would both deter Iran and protect against any use it can
make of its WMD capabilities.

- Deterrence:
Creation of military threats to Iran so great that no rational Iranian leader could see an advantage from using weapons of mass destruction.

- Preventive or Preemptive Strikes Before Iran has a Significant Nuclear Force:
Military options that would destroy Iran‘s ability to proliferate and/or deploy significant nuclear forces. To build an international consensus to allow the use military force as a last resort when all other options absolutely fail.

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Iran The Heavy Water Nuclear Reactor at Arak

Iran is building a new 40-megawatt thermal-cooled heavy water reactor in Arak. The heavy water program
has raised some questions regarding Iran‘s intentions. Iran first informed the IAEA that it was planning to
export heavy water, then they stated that the heavy water will be used as a coolant and moderator for the
planned IR-40 reactor for research and development, radio-isotope production and training.

It has been mentioned by some experts that the Iran IR-40 heavy water reactor could be operational by 2011
and would allow Iran to begin producing weapons-grade material by 2014.

Using the same basis and reactor operation factor of 0.6 as was done for the Israeli Dimona reactor, we find that the amount of Plutonium produced per year is up to 8 kg of weapons grade, enough for 1 nuclear bomb a year.

 Light Water Reactors (1000 MW(t) Bushehr Light Water Reactor for Power Generation

In a study ‗A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation of Light Water Reactors‖ Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, Harmon Hubbard, October 22, 2004. The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. They write the following:

 The report details how fresh and spent LWR fuel can be used to accelerate a nation‘s illicit weapons program
significantly. In the case of a state that can enrich uranium (either covertly or commercially), fresh lightly enriched reactor fuel rods could be seized and the uranium oxide pellets they contain quickly crushed and fluoridated.

This lightly enriched uranium feed material, in turn, could enable a would-be bomb maker to produce a significant number of weapons with one-fifth the level of effort than what would otherwise be required to enrich the natural uranium to weapons grade.

As for spent LWR fuel, the report details how about a year after an LWR of the size Iran has was brought on line, as much as 60 Nagasaki bombs‘ worth of near-weapons grade material could be seized and the first bomb made in a matter of weeks. The report also details how the reliability of the bombs made of this material, moreover, is similar to that of devices made of pure weapons grade plutonium.

The running assumption today, of course, is that any nation diverting either the fresh or spent fuel from an LWR site would be detected by IAEA inspectors. This clearly is the premise of the deal the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia are making to Iran: Russia will provide Iran with fresh reactor fuel if Iran promises to suspend activities at its known uranium enrichment facilities and surrenders spent fuel from its LWR for transit and storage in Russia.

What‘s not fully appreciated, however, is that Iran might well be able to divert these materials to covert
enrichment or reprocessing plants and might well be able to do so without detection. Lengthy exposure to spent fuel that has just left an LWR of the sort required to package and ship long distances out of the country is quite hazardous.

If Iran was set on making bombs, though, it might be willing to take the risks associated with a much
shorter transit for quick reprocessing. The health hazards associated with diverting fresh LWR fuel, on
the other hand, are virtually nil.

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Iran Uranium Enrichment Planning And Produce First Nuclear

 Uranium Enrichment Planning

Iran plans eventually to install about 50,000 machines and to install the centrifuges in modules of 3,000 machines that would be designed to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors. In a case where just 1,500 of these centrifuges were installed and optimized to produce HEU, these centrifuges could produce enough highly enriched uranium for about one nuclear weapon per year.

When completed, the FEP could be used to produce roughly 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.

 Each of Iran‘s centrifuges has an output between 2-3 SWU/year (Seperative Work Unit per Year). Iran Is planning a full scale FEP at Natanz which will eventually house 50,000 centrifuges, giving the plant a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year—enough for annual reloads of LEU for the Bushehr reactor or, if configured differently, 25-30 nuclear weapons worth of HEU per year.

 One centrifuge could produce some 30 grams of HEU per year which is equivalent to 5 SWU. As a general
rule of thumb, a cascade of 850 to 1000 centrifuge, each around 1.5 meters long operating at 400 m/sec would be able to produce about 20 to 25 kg of HEU per year, enough for one HEU bomb.

 An implosion weapon using U235 would require about 20 kg of 90% U235. Roughly 176 kg of natural uranium would be required per kg of HEU product, and about 230 SWU per kg of HEU, thus requiring a total of about 4,600 SWU per weapon. To enrich natural uranium for one gun-type uranium bomb requires roughly 14,000 SWUs. Thus, producing one HEU weapon in a year would require between 1,100 to perhaps 3,500 centrifuges.

Timeline until Iran produces it‘s first Nuclear Weapon

The question is how quickly could Iran assemble and operate 1,500 to 4,000 centrifuges in an accelerated Program to make enough HEU for at least one 15 – 20 kg nuclear bomb.

Mark Fitzpatrick. Survival Vol 48 no.3 Autumn 2006. Assessing Iran’s Nuclear program.

IISS in September 2005 assessed that earliest Iran could produce sufficient HEU is by 2010. This is achieved by Iran constructing under IAEA supervision 3,000 centrifuge cascades, then when it is ready for full operation, expels the inspectors and uses the cascades for HEU production. Assembling this many centrifuges and getting them working would take until 2009. With 3,000 centrifuges it would take 9 months at the earliest for Iran to produce 25 kg HEU deemed necessary for a simple implosion Device.

BBC Interview with US Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte (2 June 2006)

Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told BBC Radio's Today programme:
" Tehran could have a nuclear bomb ready between 2010 and 2015.We don't have a clear-cut Knowledge but the estimate we have made is some time between the beginning of the next decade and the middle of the next decade they might be in a position to have a nuclear weapon, which is a cause of great concern."

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ISIS, Iran’s Next Steps.

The timeline created:

- Assemble 1,300 – 1,600 centrifuges. Assuming Iran starts (in January 2006) assembling centrifuges at
a rate of 70-100 per month, Iran will have enough centrifuges in 6-9 months., by late 2006.

- Combine centrifuges into cascades, install control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, And test the Fuel Enrichment Plant. 1yaer.

- Enrich enough HEU for a nuclear weapon (1 Year).

- Weaponize the HEU, about 3 YEARS.
- Thus total time to build the first bomb would be about 3 YEARS, or by 2009.

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National Intelligence Estimate and Capabilities Nuclear Iran

We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.

We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

Iran "hasn't really" added any further centrifuges to refine enriched uranium, which is required for use in nuclear reactors or weapons, International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei said on Tuesday.  ElBaradei said he thought the reason for this was political. The IAEA said in its latest report in November that Iran had not boosted the number of centrifuges regularly refining uranium since reaching a level of 3,800 in September. "They haven't really been adding centrifuges, which is a good thing," ElBaradei told reporters. "Our assessment is that it's a political decision."

If Iran could operate the 3,800 installed centrifuges, it could produce enough HEU for a minimum of one implosion weapon each year. The IISS in a study ―Iran‘s Strategic Weapons Programmes : A Net Assessment.‖ 2005, states that a cascade of 1000 P1 centrifuges could produce 25 kg HEU weapons grade in 2.2 to 2.7 years, whereas a cascade of 3000 P1 centrifuges could produce the same amount between 271 – 330 days.

There is no reason to believe that Iran could not be capable of installing an additional 3,000 centrifuges in 2009, which would result in Iran having the capability to produce HEU for 2 to 4 nuclear bombs per year.Eventually, the 50,000 centrifuges planned to be installed in the Natanz Facility could produce around 500 kg of HEU per year, which is enough for about 25 – 30 nuclear bombs a year.

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Development Of Iran's Uranium And Nuclear Weapons

In 2005 Iranian officials told the IAEA of Pakistan‘s scientist A.Q. Khan‘s 1987 offer of centrifuge enrichment technology. If Iran received the same nuclear weapon design that A.Q. Khan gave Libya then we are looking at the P1and P2 centrifuges. The P1 centrifuges are based on the original 1970‘s URENCO design in the Netherlands that Khan acquired knowledge of while employed at the plant. Pakistan started with this technology to produce HEU for nuclear weapons.

In 2004 Iranian officials admitted that it also possessed more advanced P2 centrifuge technology design. Such
advanced designs could double Iran‘s enrichment capabilities, shortening the time taken for the production of HEU for a bomb. An important advantage of the gas centrifuge over the gaseous technique of enrichment is that it is much less energy intensive, and has proven to be better performance and more reliable and have a larger unit enrichment capacity.

Fissile Material Needed to Build an Atomic Bomb

a.The amount of HEU needed to make a nuclear weapon varies with the degree of enrichment and sophistication of the weapon design.

b. In general, the higher the enrichment level, the less HEU is needed to make a bomb.

c. For a HEU-based nuclear weapon, there are two basic design options:

- Gun-type weapons are far simpler in design, whereas the implosion weapon is more difficult technically but requires less HEU

- Plutonium based nuclear weapons only work as implosion weapons, with more sophisticated weapons using less plutonium.

- Gun-type weapon and Implosion weapon.

The Fuel Enrichment Plant FEP

Iran plans eventually to install about 50,000 machines and to install the centrifuges in modules of 3,000 machines that would be designed to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors. In a case where just 1,500 of these centrifuges were installed and optimized to produce HEU, these centrifuges could produce enough highly enriched uranium for about one nuclear weapon per year.

When completed, the FEP could be used to produce roughly 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.

Each of Iran‘s centrifuges has an output between 2-3 SWU/year (Seperative Work Unit per Year). Iran
Is planning a full scale FEP at Natanz which will eventually house 50,000 centrifuges, giving the plant a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year—enough for annual reloads of LEU for the Bushehr reactor or, if configured
differently, 25-30 nuclear weapons worth of HEU per year.

One centrifuge could produce some 30 grams of HEU per year which is equivalent to 5 SWU. As a general
rule of thumb, a cascade of 850 to 1000 centrifuge, each around 1.5 meters long operating at 400 m/sec would be able to produce about 20 to 25 kg of HEU per year, enough for one HEU bomb.

An implosion weapon using U235 would require about 20 kg of 90% U235. Roughly 176 kg of natural uranium would be required per kg of HEU product, and about 230 SWU per kg of HEU, thus requiring a total of about 4,600 SWU per weapon. To enrich natural uranium for one gun-type uranium bomb requires roughly 14,000 SWUs. Thus, producing one HEU weapon in a year would require between 1,100 to perhaps 3,500 centrifuges.

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Program Nuclear Iran To Produce Nuclear Weapons

Iran Produced Nuclear and Uranium

This section e assesses Iran‘s nuclear program and possible capability to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), even though it has increased some rhetoric towards the IAEA, Iran has not pulled out.

The three central facilities that are address in this study constitute the core of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle that Iran needs to produce nuclear weapons grade fissile material. The final phase, which is the process of Uranium Enrichment and fissile material production, is central in any study attempting to assess nuclear weapons production. The question is how quickly could Iran assemble and operate centrifuges in an accelerated program to make enough HEU for at least one 15 – 20 kg nuclear bomb, and when will a Plutonium Production Reactor be fully operational.

Iranian National Security Policy, justifying it‘s pursuit of a nuclear capability as a deterrent, is based on the following:

*  Iran perceives itself as having a leadership role in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world and to have a dominant role in the Gulf region especially in any GCC security arrangements.

* Iran perceives itself as having a leadership role in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world and to have a dominant role in the Gulf region especially in any GCC security arrangements.
* Israeli intentions to destabilize Iran and attack it‘s nuclear facilities.

* Iran is worried about unfriendly neighbors surrounding them, including nuclear- armed Pakistan.

 In 2005 Iranian officials told the IAEA of Pakistan‘s scientist A.Q. Khan‘s 1987 offer of centrifuge enrichment technology. If Iran received the same nuclear weapon design that A.Q. Khan gave Libya then we are looking at the P1 and P2 centrifuges.

The P1 centrifuges are based on the original 1970‘s URENCO design in the Netherlands that Khan acquired knowledge of while employed at the plant. Pakistan started with this technology to produce HEU for nuclear weapons.  In 2004 Iranian officials admitted that it also possessed more advanced P2 centrifuge technology design. Such advanced designs could double Iran‘s enrichment capabilities, shortening the time taken for the production of HEU for a bomb.

An important advantage of the gas centrifuge over the gaseous technique of enrichment is that it is much less energy intensive, and has proven to be better performance and more reliable and have a larger unit enrichment capacity.
 Uranium enrichment can be used for both peaceful (nuclear fuel) and military (nuclear weapons) uses. Gas Centrifuge Technology is central in the Uranium Enrichment process. There are three major risks associated with the application of centrifuge plants:

1. Secret use of a declared, safeguarded LEU (Low Enriched Uranium) plant to produce HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) or exceed LEU covertly.

2. Construction and operation of a clandestine plant to produce HEU.

3. Conversion of a declared, safeguarded LEU plant to HEU production following breakout (withdrawal from the NPT Treaty).

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