Technology Variants Light Tank MBT Made China

Type 62 Light Tank

Type 62 Light Tank This is a scaled-down version of the T-55 main battle tank built by China and used by China, Albania, North Korea, and several African nations. The Type 62 has an exhaust smoke-laying ability, and is amphibious. The Type 62 has a laser rangefinder and is designed for rugged terrain, with a self-recovery capability. The layout is identical to the T-55.

Type 63 Light Tank
Type 63 Light Tank A Chinese version of the PT-76, used by China, North Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, and Vietnam, with a beefed-up suspension, transmission, and engine, and more powerful gun.

Type 90 Command Post Carrier
Type 90 Command Post Carrier This is a command post version of the Type 90 armored personnel carrier. This version has a raised rear section with two man-sized and one large hatch, and a rear door. The vehicle has at least 3 radios, a 10-meter antenna mast, and a gasolinepowered 5kW generator to power the equipment. Some of these vehicles also have computers for various tasks.

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China Made Type Series Warship Class Destroyers

China since the early 1990s has built five new classes of destroyers, one of which is a variation of another. Compared to China’s 14 remaining older Luda (Type 051) class destroyers, which entered service between 1971 and 1991, these five new destroyer classes are substantially more modern in terms of their hull designs, propulsion systems, sensors, weapons, and electronics. One author states that “the new Chinese missile destroyers were apparently designed, at least on the basic level, at the Russian Northern Design Bureau....”  A key area of improvement in the new destroyer designs is their anti-air warfare (AAW) technology, which has been a significant PLA Navy shortcoming. Like the older Luda-class destroyers, these new destroyer classes are armed with ASCMs.
The Luhu-class ships Destroyers reportedly were ordered in 1985 but had their construction delayed by a decision to give priority to the construction of six frigates that were ordered by Thailand. The Luhai-class ship Destroyer is believed to have served as the basis for the Luyang 1-class destroyer designs. Compared to the Luhai, the Luyang ships destroyer appear stealthier. DOD stated in 2008 that the Luyang I design is equipped with the Russian-made SA-N-7B Grizzly SAM and the Chinese-made YJ-83 ASCM.

Luhu-class Destroyers

China to date has commissioned only 1 or 2 ships in each of these five classes, suggesting that at least some of these classes might have been intended to serve as stepping stones in a plan to modernize the PLA Navy’s surface combatant technology incrementally before committing to larger-scale series production of destroyers.

Luhai-class Destroyer

Surface Combatants
China since the early 1990s has purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and deployed nine new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates (some of which are variations of one another) that demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface combatant technology. China has also deployed a new kind of missile-armed fast attack craft that uses a stealthy catamaran hull design. The August 2009 ONI report states that “the PLA(N) surface force is one of the largest in the world, and its capabilities are growing at a remarkable rate.” The report also states that “as newer and more capable platforms replace aging platforms, the PLA(N)’s total order of battle may remain relatively steady, particularly in regard to the
surface force.”
Luyang-1 Class Destroyers

Luyang-1 Class Destroyers

Luyang IIThe Luyang II-class ships Destroyers appear to feature an even more capable AAW system that includes a Chinese made SAM system called the HHQ-9 that has an even longer range, a vertical launch system (VLS), and a phased-array radar that is outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar used in the U.S.-made Aegis combat system.

Luyang II Class Destroyers

Luzhou
DOD stated in 2007 the Luzhou-class Destryores design “is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The SA-N-20 more than doubles the range of current PLA Navy air defense systems marking a significant improvement in China’s ship-borne air defense capability.” If one or more of these destroyer designs (or a successor design) are put into larger-scale production, it would accelerate the modernization of China’s surface combatant force.

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Chinese Produce And Export PLZ05, PLZ45 and GCL45

China Produce PLZ 52 Type 05, GCL45,PLZ05 AND PLZ45

The latest tracked Chinese SPH design is  known as the Norinco PLZ52/Type 05 and is a L52 autoloading version of the 155 mm/45 calibre, 30km standard range PLZ45 which is used domestically but has only one export customer; Kuwait with 27 systems, and is capable of firing standard NATO ammunition.

A tracked solution firing 122mm D-30 rounds is also in development. The new platform could be ready for PLA deployment by 2012. Both weapons are designed to operate the Russian 155 mm Krasnopol laser-guided projectile. China has also produced a CAESAR- like truck mounted system operating the same L45 gun, known as the SH1 with a L52 variant also being developed. The smaller SH2 is a 122mm design.

China Military Defense SH2 122mm Artillery Truck

China Military Defense SH1 L52 Artillery Truck

China Produce PLZ52 Type 05 By Norinco

Norinco Reconnaissance vehicle GCL45

Chinese Produc PLZ05 By Norinco

  

China Miliatary Industry Made Norincho PLZ45

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China Global Warning UAV Xianglong

UAV Xianglong

China is apparently committed to investing in such a program and has several operational high- and medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs, with others planned, capable of carrying out reconnaissance far out at sea. The Xianglong, currently China’s largest UAV, appears to have a combat radius of 2,000–2,500 kilometers (that is, a range of 7,500 kilometers), a mission payload of six hundred kilograms, and a maximum endurance of ten hours.53 It can also carry electronic jamming pods to defend against antiradiation missiles, as well Global Positioning System jamming and antijamming capabilities.

However, the Xianglong is believed still to lack suffi cient high-altitude endurance for an anticarrier mission. Moreover, China still lacks C4ISR infrastructure such as information processing, bandwidth capacity, and network support needed for wide-area surveillance at the level of the U.S. Broad Area Maritime System.

 Further, even a fully capable UAV could be vulnerable to a carrier group’s formidable air and electronic defenses assuming the carrier(s) and accompanying ships were not operating in electronic silence in order not to announce their approach before it could provide targeting information; thus the UAV alone is not a reliable option. Theoretically, if advanced enough, UAV capabilities would be adequate for targeting if combined with other terrestrial cueing systems, such as OTH. However, the open-source literature clearly views these capabilities as currently insuffi cient to deal with superior U.S. naval power.

Overall, China’s current UAV capabilities and the risks involved in obtaining targeting information from surface combatant vessels or air forces near the CSG strongly suggest that the PLA would not depend solely upon these platforms to determine the exact location of the target. Others have surmised that the Chinese military could utilize such alternatives as China’s growing fl eet of  stealthy submarines, or even merchant fi shing vessels, to supply targeting data. For example, the PLA Navy submarine force, with its increasing number of quiet attack submarines, offers another conceivable alternative for tracking targets at sea.

These are not optimal means, but they are immediately available and could be part of an interim capability or emergency backup. To what degree these methods would be relied on in a time of confl ict is debatable; a robust and reliable targeting system to support the ASBM, of which space-based reconnaissance would be a key element, appears to be a high priority. Regardless, and given the widespread assumption that space-based targeting is critical, does China have enough of the right type of satellites to fi nd a carrier and view it frequently enough to be sure of its location, and if so, can it process and transmit the data to the launch pad quickly enough.

UAV XIALONG

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J-11 China Figter Similar To The Sukhoi Su-27 Russian

J-10 China Fighter Made

J-11 China Figter Similar To The Sukhoi Su-27 Russian

J-11 China Fighter Russian Sukhoi SU-27 Similiar

 This isn't copy, this is a big improvement. Yes first we copied we bought a whole production line to produce Su27 but later we found out that we have so many stuffs are better than what the Russian selling to us. Why do we need to copy? We put our own new radars, engines, electronic systems and weapon systems in it but we keep the Su27's frame because it has the best frame for a good fighter, now J11B is a good fighter can counter Su35, F15SE and F35, good job China.

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China Fighter J-10 Vs F-16

Fighter J-10 or China Jian serie 10 Some nice Kills on Dalian Plant.
Attention: This Server was without any Rules, on other Servers i normally avoid Basecamping!The E/F block F-16 would own the J-10. Do you know how old the J-10 design is? It was designed by the IAF and US for Israel in the 70's. The Chinese bought the plans and had the Russians modify it for them. The J-10 is dated and will never match the F-16 in avionics or radar wise.

J-10 View Video

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China Military Visi And Mission

The development of China's Military

 Determining the nature of Chinese military policy and China’s ongoing military buildup will be one of the 21st century’s key international security issues. A wide variety of governmental, military, and scholarly assessments exist on the intentions and goals of China’s military. The secretive and dictatorial nature of China’s
government and military planning limit the amount of credible information about Chinese military doctrine and strategy that can be found in open source literature. China does not publicly publish a genuine English language counterpart to U.S. national military strategy documents. The lack of transparency in Chinese military policymaking has been noted by numerous sources, including the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military power.

China Navy

It is believed that Chinese military doctrine places high emphasis on seizing the initiative in conflicts and keeping adversaries off balance through deception at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The absence of true transparency by the Chinese government and military about its military policies and doctrines, however, make any qualitatively reliable interpretation of Chinese military activities highly problematic.

China Air Forces-Fighter J-10

Since 1998, the Chinese government has biennially published what it says are English language national defense white papers, as well as selected papers on related topics such as Taiwan and its national space policy, at http://english.gov.cn /. The 2010 defense white paper (http://www.china.org.cn /english /feature /
book /194421.htm) features sections on what China sees as the international security environment and China’s role in that environment; a statement of national defense policy and organizational structure; descriptions of military force components such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its border and costal defense program; declaration of how science and technology infl uence national defense strategy; purported defense expenditures; and appendices featuring major international exchanges between China’s military and foreign militaries and the names (but not the text) of major military regulations issued during 2005–2010.

China Military Anti Terrorist

In terms of strategic defense doctrine, this treatise reveals that China places high emphasis on the important role of information technology and mechanization as driving forces in developing the PLA. It also stresses China’s need to improve its national firepower, assault, mobility, protection, and information capabilities;
enhance its efforts to build a joint operational system capable of fighting information based wars; move from a local defense posture to one capable of engaging in regional power projection; and retain a nuclear deterrent capable of deterring hostile powers.

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