Program Nuclear Iran To Produce Nuclear Weapons

Iran Produced Nuclear and Uranium

This section e assesses Iran‘s nuclear program and possible capability to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), even though it has increased some rhetoric towards the IAEA, Iran has not pulled out.

The three central facilities that are address in this study constitute the core of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle that Iran needs to produce nuclear weapons grade fissile material. The final phase, which is the process of Uranium Enrichment and fissile material production, is central in any study attempting to assess nuclear weapons production. The question is how quickly could Iran assemble and operate centrifuges in an accelerated program to make enough HEU for at least one 15 – 20 kg nuclear bomb, and when will a Plutonium Production Reactor be fully operational.

Iranian National Security Policy, justifying it‘s pursuit of a nuclear capability as a deterrent, is based on the following:

*  Iran perceives itself as having a leadership role in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world and to have a dominant role in the Gulf region especially in any GCC security arrangements.

* Iran perceives itself as having a leadership role in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world and to have a dominant role in the Gulf region especially in any GCC security arrangements.
* Israeli intentions to destabilize Iran and attack it‘s nuclear facilities.

* Iran is worried about unfriendly neighbors surrounding them, including nuclear- armed Pakistan.

 In 2005 Iranian officials told the IAEA of Pakistan‘s scientist A.Q. Khan‘s 1987 offer of centrifuge enrichment technology. If Iran received the same nuclear weapon design that A.Q. Khan gave Libya then we are looking at the P1 and P2 centrifuges.

The P1 centrifuges are based on the original 1970‘s URENCO design in the Netherlands that Khan acquired knowledge of while employed at the plant. Pakistan started with this technology to produce HEU for nuclear weapons.  In 2004 Iranian officials admitted that it also possessed more advanced P2 centrifuge technology design. Such advanced designs could double Iran‘s enrichment capabilities, shortening the time taken for the production of HEU for a bomb.

An important advantage of the gas centrifuge over the gaseous technique of enrichment is that it is much less energy intensive, and has proven to be better performance and more reliable and have a larger unit enrichment capacity.
 Uranium enrichment can be used for both peaceful (nuclear fuel) and military (nuclear weapons) uses. Gas Centrifuge Technology is central in the Uranium Enrichment process. There are three major risks associated with the application of centrifuge plants:

1. Secret use of a declared, safeguarded LEU (Low Enriched Uranium) plant to produce HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) or exceed LEU covertly.

2. Construction and operation of a clandestine plant to produce HEU.

3. Conversion of a declared, safeguarded LEU plant to HEU production following breakout (withdrawal from the NPT Treaty).